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THE NEGLECT OF SECURITY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
The Trade-off Between Liberty and Security

When people talk, as they often do, about a trade-off between security and liberty-when they say (as many people said after September 11, 2001) that we need to adjust the balance between security and
civil libertiesL-what do they mean by security? Talk of a liberty-security balance has become so common that many view it as just an
ambient feature of our political environment: "[I]t has become a part
of the drinking water in this country that there has been a tradeoff of
liberty for security, . . . that we have had to encroach upon civil liberty
and trade some of that liberty we cherish for some of that security that
we cherish even more."2 When we spend time discussing the definition of "liberty" and the concept of civil liberties, we try to be clear,
because we know it makes a difference to the trade-off what liberties
in particular we have in mind. 3 However, we almost never address
the question of what "security" means. In fact, when people talk in
literature or in court about "the definition of security" what they usually produce is some view about what security requires at a particular
time (in the way of legal or political measures). 4 They say nothing
1. We hear talk of a balance between security and liberty from all sides. We hear it
from conservatives, e.g., United States of America Department of State, Free Societies Must Balance Security, Civil Liberties, Bush Says, http://usinfo.state.gov/
dhr/Archive/2005/May/09-927114.html (last visited July 10, 2006); from liberals,
e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN.L. REV. 953, 955 (2002) ("In the wake of
September 11, we plainly need to rethink the balance between liberty and security."); and from almost everyone in between, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard
H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers: The United States'
ConstitutionalApproach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296, 298
(2004).
2. James B. Comey, FightingTerrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RICH.
L. REV. 403, 403 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL.
PHIL. 191, 195 (2003) [hereinafter Waldron, Security and Liberty] (outlining different meanings of "civil liberties"); id. at 205 (discussing the concept of negative
liberty).
4. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, NationalSecurity, and the Freedom
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 637 (2005) ("[The government has the
advantage in FOIA appeals of controlling both the disputed information andthrough Exemption l's reliance on executive orders-the definition of national
security.").

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:454

about the meaning of the concept itself. Although we know that "security" is a vague and ambiguous concept, and though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger when talk of trade-offs is
in the air, 5 still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of
legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept.
B.

Hobbes as a Theorist of Security

When legal scholars write about liberty they can take advantage of
an immense literature in political philosophy on the meaning of the
term. 6 But it is shocking to discover how little attention has been paid
to the topic of security by political philosophers. Historically, the two
philosophers who have written most about security are Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Hobbes. In his book The Theory of Legislation,
Bentham argued that "the care of security" was "the principal object of
law."7 What he meant by security, however, was legal constancy, certainty, and predictability so far as property rights were concerned,
and it might be thought that this is of limited interest in our discussion of the liberty-security trade-off in the war on terrorism. In fact
that is not the case; later we will find some aspects of Bentham's analysis to be quite useful (even though it is not an analysis which has
been picked up on by any modern discussant of security).8
If any thinker in the canon of political philosophy could serve as
the focus of a modern discussion of security, surely it would be
Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, as we all know, the whole point of the
political enterprise is security. It is for the sake of security-security
against each other and security against outsiders-that we set up a
sovereign. 9 It is the drive for security that leads us to give up our
5. In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972), the
Supreme Court spoke of the "inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept
... and the temptation to utilize such surveillance to oversee political dissent."
6. The most famous starting point for the modern discussion is ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). For a sampling of
this literature, also see the essays collected in LIBERTY (David Miller ed., 1991).
7. JEREMY BENTHAM, Principlesof the Civil Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 88,
109 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931).
8. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
9. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 77-78 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne
eds., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642) [hereinafter HOBBES, CITIZEN]
("[M]en's security requires not only accord but also subjection of wills in matters
essential to peace and defence; and... the nature of a commonwealth consists in
that union or subjection ....
[T]he security of individuals, and consequently the
common peace, necessarily require that the right of using the sword to punish be
transferred to some man or assembly; that man or that assembly therefore is
necessarily understood to hold sovereign power . . . in the commonwealth by
right.... No greater power can be imagined.").
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natural liberty and submit to the sovereign's commands.' 0 It is the
exigencies of security that determine the scale, the level, the duration,
and the quality of organization that is requisite in the political
realm."1 Hobbes was a great analyst of concepts. 12 Yet almost alone
among the leading concepts of the political realm, security is not subjected by Hobbes to any extensive analysis. The closest he comes is in
a passage from The Elements of Law, where he writes:
[A] man may... account himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee
no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by
the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves; and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. 13

Hobbes says surprisingly little beyond this about what "security" actually means, and he is followed in that by his modern commentators,
who do not so much as list the concept in their indexes.14
10. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC 111

(J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1640) [hereinafter HORBES, ELEMENTS] ("The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or
others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the
security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to
whom he doth so relinquish it.").
11. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 118 (Richard Tuck ed. Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (1668) ("[Ilf there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our
security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for
caution against all other men ....
Nor is it the joyning together of a [small]
number of men, that gives them this security.... The Multitude sufficient to
confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the
Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of
warre, as to move him to attempt.").
12. Id. at 28 ("Seeing then that the truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in
our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what
every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find
himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the
more belimed.... So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of

13.

Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes
the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets ..
").
HOBBES, ELEMENTS, supra note 10, at 111 (emphasis added). In the same chapter, Hobbes also adds an external dimension:

And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the
means of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without; if there be not some means
found, to unite their strengths and natural forces in the resistance of
such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in vain.

Id. at 112.
14.

See QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES
(1996); RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THOMAS HOBBES: SKEPTICISM, INDIVIDUALITY AND
CHASTENED POLITICS (1993); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
TRADITION (1986); GREGORY S. KAvAKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
(1986); LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND GENESIS (1963).
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Maybe this is because security operates as a sort of adjectival value
in Hobbes's account. Maybe it is a mistake to look for treatments of it
as an end in itself. Hobbes is interested in security of self-preservation, security of life and limb, security against violent death, security
of "living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to
live."15 Perhaps what we should be looking for in the index is safety,
survival or self-preservation, and not security as such. In fact there is
some discussion in Hobbes's book On the Citizen of safety and the sovereign's obligations in respect of his subjects' safety. We are told that
"[bly safety one should understand not mere survival in any condition,
but a happy life so far as that is possible,"' 6 and we are also told that
because the sovereign can operate only through general laws, "he has
done his duty if he has made every effort, to provide by sound measures for the welfare of as many of them as possible for as long as
possible." 17 Both points will be important in what follows.18
C.

Drawing a Blank

Whatever hints Hobbes has given us have not been followed up in
the political philosophy literature. When asked for articles in two
prominent political philosophy journals-Political Theory and Philosophy and Public Affairs-with the word "security" in the title, Journal
Storage: The Scholarly Journal Archive (JSTOR) returned the "No
Items Matched Your Search" result. (A search for "liberty" or "freedom" in article titles in the same journals returned seventy results.) 19
With monographs, it is harder to quantify. In this author's library,
there are brief discussions of the concept of security in Henry Shue's
book Basic Rights and in Robert Goodin's book Political Theory and
Public Policy.2O Both will be discussed below, 2 1 but for now it is sufficient to say that these are mainly on the importance and priority to be
accorded to security, not on its meaning. There is little or no discussion of security in the main texts of political philosophy. 22 The topic
does not so much as rate a mention in Will Kymlicka's introductory
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 11, at 91.
HOBBES, CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 143.

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
JSTOR: Expert Search, http://www.jstor.org/search/ExpertSearch
July 11, 2006).

(last visited

HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
20-22 (1980); ROBERT E. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 220-41

(1982).
21. For Goodin, see infra text accompanying note 56. For Shue, see infra text accompanying note 54.
22. There is also some discussion of topics surrounding security and the obligations
of the state in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 54-146 (1974). This

is, however, mostly entangled in a technical discussion of the legitimacy of a minimal libertarian state. For a very recent and helpful discussion of security, also
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text 2 3 or in William Connolly's Terms of PoliticalDiscourse,2 4 while in

D.D. Raphael's text, discussion of security is
limited to a brief discussion of the state's role in upholding rights. 25
As for the spate of books that appeared in the years immediately
following the terrorist outrages of September 11, 2001, there is constant reference to the liberty-security trade-off. However, although
these authors give us all sorts of recommendations and bright ideas
about what is likely to promote or enhance
security, they offer us little
or nothing on what security means. 26
D.

Collective Security, National Security, and Human
Security
We should be clear about what we are looking for. There is an im-

mense literature on national security and also on collective security in

the theory and study of international relations. There are whole journals called National Security Outlook and Journalof National Secur-

ity Law and Policy, and innumerable articles with "collective security"
in the title.27 But these concepts are not quite the same as the security contemplated here.
The idea of collective security operates at the wrong level; it concerns security as among the nations of the world (or various subsets of
them) determined by institutions, alliances and the balance of power,
whereas here we are interested in security conceived as an attribute of
individuals and populations. This is not to say that there may not be
things to glean from the literature on collective security. The collective aspect itself is worth considering. What is striking in that discourse is that security is not understood as something most nations
can pursue by and for themselves. It needs to be pursued by groups of
nations either acting in concert or by sets of antagonists acting in
ways that establish stable equilibria; or it needs to be pursued by the

23.

see GLYN MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE: PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 97-104 (2005).
WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION

(1990).
24. W.E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (Princeton Univ. Press
1983) (1974).

25. D.D.

RAPHAEL, PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

(1970).
26. See, e.g.,

(MacMillan Press 1976)

B. HEYMAN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITH158-79 (2003). Heyman devotes a final chapter to "Values and Security" which contains a sophisticated and helpful account of the trade-offs we face
between security and democratic liberties; but there is no discussion of the meaning of security.
27. See, e.g., Richard K. Betts, Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe, 17 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1992); Hans Kelsen,
Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United
Nations, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 783 (1948).
OUT WAR

PHILIP
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whole community of nations acting in concert. The very concept of security may not entail this-i.e., the need for concert or equilibrium
may not be axiomatic. Very powerful countries may sometimes be in a
position to pursue their own security unilaterally, by their own energy
and resources in the international arena. Still, for most countries
most of the time, and even for the most powerful countries some of the
time, the pursuit of national security is impossible except in the context of collective security as a structured good enjoyed multilaterally.
When we drop down a level from the international arena (where a
couple of hundred nations jostle for security) to the interpersonal level
(where millions of individuals jostle for safety in a particular political
community), we should be open to the possibility that the notion of
to be considered as a colsecurity appropriate at this level also needs
2
lective rather than an individual good. 8
What about the concept of national security? Here the trouble is
that the phrase "national security" conveys ideas about the integrity
and power of the state itself as an institutional apparatus and that is
something which may or may not be related to ordinary citizens' being
more secure. 2 9 That is probably not the meaning of security that people have in mind when they say they are willing to trade liberty for
security. When it is said that liberty must be traded off for the sake of
security, what is meant by "security" is people being more secure
rather than governmental institutions being more powerful. National
security agencies are, of course, involved in the struggle to protect us
against terrorism, but their security is valued for the sake of our security. The power of the national security apparatus is not valued as
an end in itself. Maybe "homeland security" is a better term. "Human
security" is another phrase in increasingly common usage, 30 and it
has the additional advantage of avoiding some of the residual national
security connotations of "homeland security" in the United States.
28. See infra text accompanying note 107.
29. There is an interesting discussion of the ambiguities of"national security" in Arnold Wolfers, "NationalSecurity" as an Ambiguous Symbol, 67 POL. ScI. Q. 481
(1952). See also GOODIN, supra note 20, at 235 (discussing the meaning and genesis of the term "national security").
30. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand
Themes of UN Reform, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 619, 623-24 (2005); see also Ved P.
Nanda, Preemptive and Preventive Use of Force, Collective Security, and Human
Security, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 10 (2004) ("Over the years, the concept of
security-traditionally viewed as state security-has expanded to include
human security as well as state security. As the Commission on Human Security
articulated in 2003, the international community 'urgently needs a new paradigm of security.' The reason given by the Commission is that: '. . . The state
remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations-and at times has even become a source of threat to its own
people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the
security of the people-human security.'" (footnotes omitted) (quoting COMM'N ON
HUMAN SECURITY, HuMAN SECURITY Now 2 (2003))).
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In general, although there is a massive literature on collective security and national security, it is not complemented by, nor is it able
to build upon or presuppose, a similarly rich and copious theoretical
literature on security as a domestic political ideal. We philosophers
write endlessly about the meaning of liberty; but we have devoted very
little attention to the ideal on the other side of the balance-homeland
security, human security, people's security-as a primary goal or function of the state. So long as our study remains unbalanced in that
way, we can hardly reach an adequate view of the trade-off. 3 1
II.

THE PURE SAFETY CONCEPTION AND
ITS SHORTCOMINGS

This Essay proposes to begin remedying that situation. It attempts to analyze the concept of security, and tease out of that analysis some important issues that are relevant to clear thinking about the
trade-offs we face between security and liberty.
Let us begin the analysis with a modest question: What is the relation between security and personal safety? A person is safe to the extent that she is alive and unharmed. Is a population more secure
simply by virtue of people being safer, i.e., simply in terms of a diminution in the prospect of their being killed or harmed? Or should we
have in mind a richer notion of security involving elements of wellbeing other than survival, or a more structured notion (perhaps thinking of security as a certain kind of public good or as a good connoting a
certain quality of relationship with others)?
It is surely tempting to associate the "security" that we talk
about-when we oppose liberty to security in assessing changes in our
laws and practices since September 11, 2001-with the probability
that any given one of us will be affected physically by a terrorist outrage. Nobody wants to be blown up. So security might be understood
simply as a function of individual safety. We might say, I am more
secure against terrorist attack when the probability of my being killed
or harmed as a result of such attack goes down; and we are more secure when this is true of many of us. This is "the pure safety
conception."
Though it is a very good starting point, we should not be satisfied
with the pure safety conception. It is a radically stripped-down idea,
and it is worth listing the issues it fails to raise and the concerns (commonly associated with the security side of the liberty-security balance)
31. The author is as guilty of this as anyone. In a recent article on liberty and security, I took the latter concept for granted. For the closest I came in that article to
any serious reflection on the structure of the concept of security, see Waldron,
Security and Liberty, supra note 3, at 204-05 n.23.
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that it does not address. Seven issues seem important (though this is
by no means an exhaustive list):
(1) The pure safety conception offers no explanation of why we fear
death or injury in some guises and not others-why we orient the
notion of safety which we are using to form our conception of security towards violent death or injury and perhaps particularly towards violent death or injury at the hands of a particular sort of
assailant, namely terrorists.
(2) The focus of the pure safety conception is bodily survival and bodily integrity. But what about material loss, such as loss of property or economic value? Is a notion of security adequate if it does
not take these into account?
(3) The pure safety conception focuses on the objective facts of death
and injury and the actual probabilities of their occurrence. It says
nothing about the subjective aspect-fear, for example, considered
not just as an emotional response to a diminution in actual safety,
but as a mental state that is itself partly constitutive of insecurity.
(4) Similarly, the pure safety conception does not adequately highlight the element of assurance or guarantee that the word "security" connotes. I am secure not just because I happen to be safe, but
because I am sure of not being killed or harmed.
(5) The shortcoming referred to in point (4) also means that the pure
safety conception does not alert us to the relation between security
and the possession of other values that the element of assurance
may relate to. It may be inappropriate to think of security as a
good in its own right; it may be more sensible to think of it as a
mode in which other goods are enjoyed. I enjoy my property or my
health securely. I may enjoy certain liberties, such as the practice
of my religion or the freedom to express my political views,
securely.
(6) The pure safety conception focuses mainly on the individualized
physical facts of death, injury, and loss rather than more diffuse
harms to persons and people in general resulting from disruption
of their way of life or the interruption of familiar routines. In that
regard, it fails to capture the connection between the idea of security and the idea of a social order, which by definition, is something
enjoyed by many.
(7) Finally, being a purely individual measure, the pure safety conception does not yet provide a basis for talking critically about the
security of the whole community. It does not adequately confront
aggregative or distributive issues. In setting out the pure safety
conception we discussed safety as a probabilistic measure of death
or injury for individual persons and the most we could say about
security for a whole society is that we are more secure when the
probability of death or injury goes down for many of us. This is
very imprecise. We need to consider ways of talking about situa-
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tions in which one person's security is enhanced at the cost of another's. In these situations how are we to say whether the security
of the whole society has gone up or down?
This Essay does not denigrate or dismiss the pure safety conception, argue that it is incoherent, or propose that we replace it with
some more amiable notion of communal solidarity. The hard Hobbesian link between security and survival is without doubt the core of the
concept. Moreover, it is not unreasonable for people to be preoccupied
with their personal safety, under the heading of "security," when they
contemplate trade-offs between liberty and security in relation to the
threat from terrorism. The threat from terrorism is deadly, not just
disruptive. Again, nobody wants to be blown up. The pure safety conception may be defective, but no attempt to remedy its defects can possibly be adequate if such attempt cuts the concept adrift from the
element of physical safety. When people are frightened, the issue of
physical safety looms large and it may be difficult to focus on the more
sophisticated aspects of security when we are concerned with the immediate prospect of death, injury, or loss. At the same time, it is
worth considering what a richer notion of security involves, if only to
see how much panic causes us to lose when we become preoccupied
with physical safety under the immediate pressure of events.
People occasionally assert that a "deepening" or a theoretical "enrichment" of the notion of security is a trick employed to sneak civil
libertarian concerns into the security pan of the liberty-security balance. We are supposed to be balancing liberty against security, they
say, and we should not confuse matters with some fancy analysis that
shows that security actually requires liberty. These people are right:
all such trickery should be resisted. On the other hand, we are not in
a position to say that liberty and security are utterly independent values which can be weighed and balanced against each other until we
have a clear and honest sense of what security involves. It is possible
that analysis of these concepts will reveal some internal connections,
in which case we will need to be much more careful in our talk about
"balance" and "trade-offs." We cannot casually rule that out. Moreover, if there are important internal connections between the concepts,
they are likely to cut both ways in the political debate. Partisans of
security may need to face up to the fact that what most people (in this
country) want to secure is not just life, but their American way of life,
which has traditionally been associated with the enjoyment of certain
liberties. Equally, partisans of civil liberties need to face up to the fact
that what people want is secure liberty, not just liberty left open to
abuse and attack. We should not be playing word games. On the
other hand we should not dismiss or ignore connections like these simply because they are likely to be misused politically by advocates on
the political left or right.
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We shall now proceed to consider adding to or enriching the pure
safety conception in respect of its depth and in respect of its breadth.
Depth looks to the enrichment of our notion of a person's security;
breadth looks to the enrichment of our notion of a whole community's
security. In addition we should think of ways in which the two dimensions are connected, for a sense of individual security is not easily separable from a sense of what an entire community has to lose when it is
subject to attack.
Inasmuch as this Essay deals with the two dimensions separately,
they will be addressed as follows: Under the heading of depth, we shall
ask several questions: How shallow is an account of individual security which focuses purely on safety? Are there aspects of our personal
apprehensions or our sense of what we personally have to lose that a
safety focused concept fails to take into account? These questions
raise issues (1) through (5) on the list above. Should our estimation of
security take into account not just threats to life and limb, but also
threats to material and economic well-being or the fear of such threats
and the assurance that people crave against such apprehensions?
Should the meaning of "security" take into account threats that come
from agents other than terrorism, such as threats from hurricanes
and other ways in which life and health are endangered? What about
threats from the state, perhaps in other countries, where the very organization that is supposed to guarantee security is the main thing
that many people fear?
Regarding these questions about depth, it must be emphasized
that what we face here are not just choices--deciding whether to
think about security this way or that-but the exploration of reasons.
The pressure to deepen our notion of personal security arises from the
fact that many of the reasons that motivate the pure safety conception
also seem to point us towards a deeper conception. On the other hand,
if we are reluctant to extend our conception of security too far in any of
these directions, we need to ask what grounds that reluctance. Is it
that deepening of the concept would be politically embarrassing? Or
are there are genuine reasons for not budging from the pure safety
conception's emphasis on life and limb?
Under the heading of breadth, issue (7) in particular invites us to
pay attention to ways of talking about safety across the whole range of
those who are supposed to be protected by our government's actions.
We saw that Thomas Hobbes suggested that because a sovereign can
operate only through general laws, "he has done his duty if he has
made every effort, to provide by sound measures for the welfare of as
many of [his subjects] as possible for as long as possible."3 2 Is this
satisfactory? Is security a majoritarian concept (like the greatest hap32.

HOBBES, CITIZEN,

supra note 9, at 143.
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piness of the greatest number)? Is Hobbes's reason-the generality of
law-sufficient to convince us of that? Or should we think of security
more as a basic right, to be guaranteed at least at a minimum level to
everybody, or perhaps as a primary good, to be subject to principles of
distributive justice?33 There are hard questions to be faced here. We
need to explore the possibility that diminutions or enhancements in
security may be unevenly distributed, that the government may respond to a threat to the security of some but not to a threat to the
security of others. Above all, something must be said about the prospect that the security of some is protected or enhanced only because
the security of others has been reduced (and reduced by state activity,
not just by neglect). To address these possibilities, we may need to
add some structure to the pure safety conception, as it applies to a
whole community. To be sure, security is not another word for distributive justice. But if it is conceived as a good, then the question of how
it is distributed-who enjoys it and who does not enjoy it-cannot be
ignored. So, under the heading of breadth, we will try to understand
security for a whole community as a complex function of individual
safety-a function that is attentive to the means by which safety is
assured and to the relational aspects of the distribution of safety when
those aspects are upheld in certain kinds of public order.
The discussion begins with the issues of depth that have been identified. We need to know more about the nature and quality of the good
we are considering before we think about the way in which it is provided and distributed. However, this strategy will prove difficult to
sustain. The two dimensions-depth and breadth-become quickly
entangled. When we start asking ourselves what a person's security
consists in beyond his personal safety, we are bound to consider the
importance for each person of certain social goods, and these may introduce an implicit distributive dimension or a consideration of modes
of public provision that short-circuits any tidy separation of issues of
depth and issues of breadth. Equally important in our discussion of
depth is the mode of assurance associated with each person's security,
where we quickly find ourselves considering the idea of mutual assurance (the way we look out for each other on these matters), and this
too takes us across the tidy border to distributive issues.
The discussion of depth will be divided into two phases. It will first
be considered in Part III, where items (2) through (5) will be examined. Part IV will continue with a discussion of breadth-distributive issues and issues about the formal provision of security to the
members of a society. Here, along with item (7) on the list, we will
also address item (1) because the way in which distributive issues
arise is often affected by who or what is seen as the threat to security.
33. For the basic rights approach, see SHUE, supra note 20, at 20-22. For the idea of
primary goods, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-95 (1971).
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Part V returns to issues of depth in light of the discussion of breadth,
and that will involve some consideration of item (6)-the importance
of security for our whole way of life, which cannot so easily be separated from communal, distributive, and civil libertarian concerns.
III.
A.

DEEPENING THE PURE SAFETY CONCEPTION

Economic Loss and Mode of Life

Nobody wants to be blown up. People worry about the loss of their
lives in relation to terrorist attacks. They also worry about their bodily integrity, about being injured or maimed, even if sheer survival is
still their most important concern. Beyond this, what about damage
to property-to homes, cars, and the things that people rely on for
their ordinary activities? A plan for security that did not propose to
protect property would be regarded by most of us as pretty impoverished. It is not just a matter of protecting it as material wealth; it is a
matter of protecting the role that people's possessions play in their
individual and family mode of life. "Mode of life" means not just daily
routines but also the reasonable aspirations people have for their
lives: the trajectory of their lives. Each individual has and pursues a
mode of living, a life plan (in a very informal sense), for herself and
her family members, and an awful lot of things play a part in that.
People value and rightly demand the protection of all that under the
heading of their security. This does not mean that people are entitled
to an assurance of success, but they may well think themselves entitled, as an aspect of security, to protection for the assets they have
accumulated for themselves and their families as part of a normal attempt to put an ordinary plan of life into action.
Once we start thinking along these lines, we see that an adequately deep conception of security should aim to protect people's individual and familial modes of living themselves, and not just the life,
health, and possessions that are necessary for it. A situation in which
lives and property are safe from attack, but modes of life are not (because a lot of time must be spent cowering in sealed rooms, for example), or a situation in which one's daily routines are safe and
protected, but at the expense of the ordinary aspirations that most
people have for the trajectory of their lives (pursuing a career, raising
a family, seeking education, promotions, etc.) would not or should not
be regarded as a situation of security. The pure safety conception ignores factors like these, but a deeper notion of security will insist on
taking them into account.
B.

Security and Fear

Each person wants not only protection for his or her life, health,
possessions, and mode of living, but also freedom from fear about
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these things. (One meaning of the word "security" connotes nothing
but the absence of this fear: "Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger."3 4) That
the element of fear is not insignificant is indicated by the word "terrorism" itself.3 5 It is a mode of attack on people's lives which is calculated to generate an enormous amount of fear and anxiety, not to
mention the anguish and horror that accompany the loss of life and
limb associated with terror attacks themselves. Diminishing the objective threat to life, health, possessions, and mode of living-diminishing the probability that they will be harmed or damaged-is one
way of securing against this fear. On the other hand, we have to figure what to say about the extent to which the fear and terror associated with insecurity may be disproportionate to the actual likelihood
of the events that frighten us.
It is common for cynics to remind people that their chance of death
and injury due to road accidents, for example, is much greater than
their chances of death or injury due to terrorist attacks, and it is sometimes suggested that people are irrational in not calling for precautions against the former in the same way that they call for precautions
against the latter.3 6 There is something to this point, but not much.
Certainly incidents involving large numbers of deaths-such as in the
World Trade Center attacks or the crashing of a hijacked airplanehave a grip on the fearful imagination which is out of proportion to
people's response to the same number of deaths spread out across
thousands of ordinary accidents.37 However, there is actually considerable rationality to the enhanced fear as a result of attacks such as
those that took place on September 11, 2001. First, in the months
that followed 9/11, nobody knew if these attacks would be repeated on
the same or even greater scale; indeed we still do not know whether
these were isolated incidents or whether we are going to end up in a
34. This is the third meaning given for "security" in the Oxford English Dictionary.
THE OXFORD NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY 854 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds.,

2d ed., 1989).
35. See Samuel Scheffler, Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive? 14 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 2-3

(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Terrorism and the Uses of Terror, 8 J. ETHICS 5, 8-9
(2004) [hereinafter Waldron, Terrorism].
36. It has been suggested that 350 excess deaths were caused after September 11,
2001, by Americans using their cars instead of flying to wherever they were going. Gerd Gigerenzer, DreadRisk, September 11, and Fatal Traffic Accidents, 15
PSYCHOL. Sci. 286, 287 (2004); Jon Elster, Fear, Terror, and Liberty: A Conceptual Framework 8-9 (Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
37. See, e.g., Neil Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risk: A
Cross-NationalComparison, 69 Mo. L. REv. 991 (2004) (suggesting that this effect is quite localized depending on the vividness of recent experience in a given
country); see generally Amos Tversky, Assessing Uncertainty, 36 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC'Y SERIES B (METHODOLOGICAL) 148, 149-52 (1974) (discussing illusions and
faulty reasoning in regard to fear under conditions of uncertainty).
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situation like that of modern Israel, in which terrorist outrages occur
38
weekly or monthly, with a constant drumbeat of death and injury.
It is as though a car accident suddenly involved a hundred or a thousand deaths, with no guarantee that accidents would not continue
happening on that scale. Secondly, the risk of death or injury from
terrorist threats is not an alternativeto the threat of death or injury
on the roads (as though we could choose one or the other). The threats
are cumulative. Thirdly, it is just not true that we have taken no efforts to address carnage on a similar scale on the roads. An immense
amount of effort has been devoted to making our roads safer and our
driving safer, and the effort continues. 3 9 However, despite our best
efforts, a number of accidents resulting in death and injury will probably keep occurring. The point about terrorist attacks on the mainland
of the United States is that they represented a new kind of threat, and
new restrictions were thought necessary to meet them (just as new
restrictions were thought necessary with the advent of the automobile). People are understandably very frightened while we take the
measure of this new threat. Fourthly, people are rightly worried
about intentional threats, particularly intentional threats which seem
to aim to target people in their ordinary peaceful activities (as opposed
to in military conflict where intentional threats are expected). Partly
this is because it is harder to guard against intentional threats: road
accidents are not trying to penetrate our defenses. It is also partly
because, in a way that is not always easy to explain, it is somehow
intrinsically worse to face a prospect of death in a deliberate attack
than to face a prospect of accidental death.40
Still, fears are not always rational. They do not always conform to
the objective probabilities or follow them up or down in any orderly
fashion. Inasmuch as fear of attack does not correspond exactly to
probability of attack (e.g., with fear remaining high even when
probability diminishes) it may be thought that the reduction of fear
ought to be regarded as an additional and independent element of security. In other words, fear is not just a response to something called
insecurity; it is partly constitutive of insecurity. A given degree of fear
may not be a rational response to a given probability of death or injury, but we must still treat the fear as significant for security in its
38. In the fifty-nine-month period between September 11, 2001, and June 4, 2006,
Israel has endured more than 98 suicide bombings and other outrages, resulting
in 627 deaths and injuries to more than 3,463 people. Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of
Principles (Sept. 1993), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i5dO.
39. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, http://www.nhtsa.gov/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2006) (describing various safety measures); see also GLEN C.
BLOMQUIST, THE REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY (1988).
40. For a discussion of this point, see P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, in
FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (1974).
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own right.41 Fear itself is something to be dreaded inasmuch as it can
42
have a psychologically debilitating effect.
Regarding fear as an aspect of insecurity in itself gives rise to all
sorts of dangers. Suppose Americans experience a level of fear of terrorist attack in 2006 that is rationally appropriate to the actual frequency of attack in Israel but not to the actual frequency of attack in
the United States. Should the American government respond to that
insecurity with measures that would be appropriate to the Israeli situation, in the hope that this will allay Americans' fears to some extent?
If we say "no," it sounds as if the government is not taking people's
fear seriously; it is condescending to those who are afraid for the government to tell them that it will respond only to rational fears, not to
the debilitating fear that they actually experience. On the other hand,
we need to remember that pandering to these exaggerated fears may
also involve adverse effects on others. What if people's irrational fears
will not be allayed unless we incarcerate all young Muslim men in our
cities? Certainly there will be objections to doing this from the civil
liberties side of the balance, but are we clear what to think about this
from the security side?
Someone might respond that all of this provides a good reason for
keeping the discussion of security simple, for keeping it focused on
objective facts about safety, by tying it down (if need be) to the pure
safety conception. If we try to enrich it with psychology, we get into
these terrible conundrums about what security requires in regard to
irrational fears. This simplification is a mistake. We should not define our concepts just to avoid hard questions. We did not begin with
any guarantee that the concept of security was straightforward or
morally unproblematic. Our task in analyzing the concept is to find
out whether that is so. It is better to say up front that there is an
inherent reference to levels of subjective fear in our concept of security
and that therefore the pursuit of security is fraught with moral difficulty, than to try sanitizing the concept and pretend that all its difficulties arise exogenously from competition with other values.
C.

Security and Assurance

Connected with the above points about fear are some points about
the relation between security and assurance and our view of the future. Earlier the work of the early nineteenth-century utilitarian theorist Jeremy Bentham was mentioned. 43 In his writings on civil law,
41. For the suggestion that security has a subjective as well as an objective sense, see
Wolfers, supra note 29, at 485 ("[S]ecurity in an objective sense, measures the
absence of threat to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear
that such values will be attacked.").
42. See Waldron, Terrorism, supra note 35, at 14-16, 22-23.
43. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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Bentham invited us to "consider that man is not like the animals, limited to the present ... but ... susceptible of pains and pleasures by
anticipation; and that it is not enough to secure him from actual loss,
but it is necessary also to guarantee him, as far as possible, against
44
future loss."
Expectation is crucial to human life, according to Bentham: "It is
hence that we have the power of forming a general plan of conduct; it
is hence that the successive instants which compose the duration of
life are not isolated and independent points, but become continuous
parts of a whole."45 The need to secure expectations was the basis of
Bentham's conception of property. He argued that if people do not
have an assurance projected into the future that what they have they
can hold, the enjoyment of property and the incentives that are supposed to derive from that enjoyment will simply evaporate. "When insecurity reaches a certain point, the fear of losing prevents us from
enjoying what we possess already. The care of preserving condemns
us to a thousand sad and painful precautions, which yet are always
liable to fail of their end."4 6 Bentham also recognized that in the field
of property, expectation is entirely the work of law: "I cannot count
upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except through the
promise of the law which guarantees it to me."47 Now, this sort of
security faces a threat from law itself, if expectations are overturned
with too-frequent legal change. 48 But there are external threats as
well:
Fraud and injustice secretly conspire to appropriate [abor's] fruits. Insolence
and audacity think to ravish them by open force. Thus security is assailed on
every side-ever threatened, never tranquil, it exists in the midst of alarms.
The legislator needs a vigilance always sustained, a power always in action, to
49
defend it against this crowd of indefatigable enemies.

To sustain security, therefore, it is not enough that threats of this
kind be repelled. There must be an assurance that they will be repelled, an assurance that people can count on and build upon in advance of the outcome of any particular attack.
Bentham made his points about property but analogous points
might be made about safety. It is not enough that we turn out to be
safe. We are not really secure unless we have an assurance of safety.
We need that assurance because we want not only to have our lives
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 112.
"As regards property, security consists in receiving no check, no shock, no derangement to the expectation founded on the laws, of enjoying such and such a
portion of good. The legislator owes the greatest respect to this expectation which
he has himself produced." Id. at 113.
49. Id. at 110.
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and limbs but to do things with them, make plans and pursue longterm activities to which an assurance of safety is integral. 50 Our
safety is not just an end in itself, but an indispensable platform or
basis on which we will enjoy other values and activities. It cannot
serve those other values unless it is assured. We may be thankful for
our survival, but we cannot use our safety if survival is simply the
fortuitous outcome of a long process of shivering terror.
D.

Security and Other Goods

Should we therefore follow Bentham's lead and detach security
from considerations of survival altogether? Bentham's property
owner, who craves security of expectation so that he can give himself
up to the cultivation of a field "with the sure though distant hope of
harvest,"51 does not necessarily have his survival at stake (though of
course in some cases his subsistence may depend upon his plan for
cultivation). What he wants security of is the enjoyment of the fruits
of his labor. Security is oriented to enjoyment not to safety. Similarly,
a professor values his tenure, not because it gives him security of life
and limb; he may be perfectly able to survive if he is fired. He wants
security of tenure so that he can be assured that his controversial
writings will not endanger his scholarly career. People want security,
in this sense, for all sorts of things. Pursuing this line of thought, we
can see that security is not so much a good in and of itself, but (as I
said earlier) something "adjectival"-a mode of enjoying other goods,
an underwriting of other values, a guarantor of other things we care
about.52
Some of these goods might be liberties. We might think of ourselves as secure (or insecure) in the privacy of our homes, secure (or
insecure) against arbitrary incarceration, secure (or insecure) in our
religious freedom. A demand for civil liberties is often a demand for
security in this regard. Does this show that the connection between
security and liberty is internal, so that talk of a balance or trade-off is
inappropriate, since it is usually independent values that we balance
50. We might develop a similar point on the basis of Hobbes's claims about all the
human goods that will be unattainable if there is no assurance against war and
violent death.
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof
is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Ncvigation,
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious
Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of
Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 11, at 89.
51. BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 112.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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and trade-off against one another? That conclusion would be too
hasty. There is certainly a sense of "security" which refers to a mode of
enjoying liberty (and other goods), and in that sense it might be inappropriate to talk of a liberty-security trade-off, but that does not mean
there cannot be trade-offs between liberty and security in another
sense of security that is tied more closely to safety. Some examples
might be security of life, limb, and property, security in relation to
from the fear
one's ordinary expectations and way of life, and security
3
that might imperil one's enjoyment of all that.5
This is a delicate point. We do need to deepen our notion of security so that it is not just a matter of probability of bodily harm; and any
reasonable notion of security has to attend to issues of confidence or
assurance in regard to the goods it protects. However, deepening the
concept and paying attention to the element of assurance should not
be a way of evacuating the concept of its distinctive content. Those
who want to persist with talk of a liberty-security trade-off may be
perfectly happy to talk, in more complicated terms, about a trade-off
between assurance (or security) of liberty and assurance (or security)
of safety, and we should not play word games to obstruct this.
On the other hand, we have to remain open to the possibility that
there are substantial, as opposed to purely verbal, internal connections between security (or security of safety) and liberty (or security of
liberty). Henry Shue defends such a position in his book Basic Rights,
where he argues that security against the threat of attack is absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of any right:
No one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if
someone can credibly threaten him with murder, rape, beating, etc., when he
or she tries to enjoy the alleged right. Such threats to physical security are
among the most serious and-in much of the world-the most widespread
hindrances to the enjoyment of any right.... In the absence of physical security people are unable to use any other rights that society may be said to be
dangers they
protecting without being liable to encounter many of the worst
54
would encounter if society were not protecting the rights.

Note, however, that Shue concentrates on security against threats actually targeted at the enjoyment of one's rights. It is a further question whether his argument applies for security generally. Suppose a
person is insecure because of the danger of terrorist attack. Let us
assume that the terrorists simply intend to kill and wound a large
number of people (perhaps including him) and do not really care either
way about other rights enjoyed or exercised by the potential victims of
their attacks. Is it still true that the enjoyment of rights is debilitated
by insecurity in that sense? Perhaps, but the argument would be less
direct than the argument Shue provides. The argument would be that
security in this sense is a condition for rights inasmuch as our hypo53. See infra Part VI.
54. STuE, supra note 20, at 21.
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thetical insecure person needs to be able to concentrate on his exercise
of rights and make plans utilizing his rights, and he cannot do this if
he is distracted by terror.
If we accept anything like Shue's argument, then it looks as though
defenders of rights should be hesitant about voicing rights-based complaints against increases in security, since security is the sine qua non
for the enjoyment of their rights. However, even if security is the necessary condition for the enjoyment of rights, it does not necessarily
follow that security should have absolute priority. For one thing, a
necessary condition for X is worth supplying only if there is a practicable possibility of securing sufficient conditions for X; if there is no such
possibility, then we should forget about the necessary conditions for
X.55 More importantly, there is something perverse about giving absolute priority to security over rights if security is valued only for the
sake of rights. Surely we do not want to devote all our resources and
energy to fulfilling a necessary condition for something we value, and
nothing at all to the thing that we value. We need to find some balance between the conditions for securing a value and the (perhaps
56
sometimes precarious) enjoyment of the value itself.
In any case, though Shue's point is no doubt important, it is probably a mistake to think of physical security only as a basic condition for
the enjoyment and exercise of rights. 5 7 People value their safety and
their physical survival in and of itself, and they will fight to preserve
their lives long after it has become evident that for them a life of enjoyment and autonomy is unavailable. It may seem odd to some of us
that life should be clung to apart from its quality, or that bodily integrity should be valued apart from the freedom to decide what to do with
our bodies, but there it is: many people's values work in this way and
an understanding of security should be sensitive to that.58
IV.

PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY

Having completed an initial deepening of the pure safety conception, we turn now to questions of breadth. The aim in this Part is to
consider the application of the term "security" to the conditions of life
55. This can be illustrated with an analogy. A necessary condition for me to visit the
moon is that I should begin astronaut training right now, but even assuming that
my visiting the moon is highly desirable, the necessary condition for it is simply
of no interest since it is not going to happen. See Waldron, Security and Liberty,
supra note 3, at 208-09.
56. See GOODIN, supra note 20, at 233.
57. Shue recognizes this when he says, "Regardlessof whether the enjoyment of physical security is also desirable for its own sake, it is desirable as part of the enjoyment of every other right." SHUE, supra note 20, at 21 (emphasis added).
58. For a very interesting discussion of different ways of reckoning the value of life,
see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 81-101 (1993).
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of a whole population as opposed to one individual. Everything that
we have established in Part III should be assumed in what follows.
From now on when individual security is discussed, more than just a
reference to improbability of harm to life and limb is intended; security now comprises protection against harm to one's basic mode of life
and economic values, as well as reasonable protection against fear and
terror, and the presence of a positive assurance that these values will
continue to be maintained into the future. What is needed now is to
discuss how we should think about the application of that somewhat
deeper notion of security across a whole population of millions or hundreds of millions of individuals. Only by doing this is it possible to
think about security as a social and political goal, as opposed to an
individual goal.
A.

Breadth and Distribution

When "the pure safety conception" was introduced, we observed
that it barely moves beyond a Hobbesian individual measure. It provides no basis for thinking about the security of the community as opposed to the security of this or that individual (at a given time). The
pure safety conception treats security as a probabilistic measure of
death or injury for individual persons. The most we could say in Part
II about the application of the pure safety conception to the security of
a whole society is that we are more secure when the probability of
death, injury, or loss goes down for many of us. That is both imprecise
and unsatisfactory.
So we must turn now to questions of breadth. How do we think
about the provision of security across a whole population? Survival
and safety refer to individual life and limb. How do we move from
there to talk of the security of a society as a whole? Readers will recall
that our direct interest is not in what is called "national security," for
59
that seems to refer to the integrity and power of the state apparatus.
We are interested instead in what national security is for-namely,
the security of the people of the nation. Our question is thus, How do
we move from talk about one person's security to talk about the security of a population comprising 300 million people? Remember that security for each person is a matter of more or less, and that our
discussion of depth has indicated that this "more or less" might have
to be assessed across various dimensions. How are we to think about
cases where some individuals could be made much more secure (in
some dimensions) by making others somewhat less secure? What are
the implications of such possibilities for our talk of the security of a
whole population? When we talk about security for a whole population, are we implying anything about the distribution across that pop59. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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ulation of security as enjoyed by individuals? If we are, is that
implication purely aggregative (as Hobbes suggests with his talk of
"sound measures for the welfare of as many of them as possible"),6o or
does it have an egalitarian component (i.e., "equal protection")? Are
we committed to maximizing security or paying attention to the equity
of its enjoyment?
B.

Policy and Definition

In thinking about this, it is not always easy to distinguish questions of definition from questions of policy. As a matter of security
policy, we might ask questions like the following: Should the government pay attention to the equality or inequality of the security enjoyed by individuals? Should it aim to see that the security of all its
members is above a certain threshold, and regard itself as having
failed if any significant number of people fall below that threshold?
Or should it take its task to be purely additive-to make as many people as secure as possible, even if that means accepting the endangerment of some for the sake of the security of the greater number? We
might return answers to these policy questions, on various grounds,
without any reference to the meaning of the word "security" as applied
to whole populations. We might think that analysis of meanings does
not help us very much with these questions, or we may reject the idea
of being dictated to in matters of policy by conceptual analysis.
Still, we should not rule out the possibility that as applied to whole
populations, the word "security" has a meaning which inclines towards one of these policy options and not the others. Many of the
value concepts of our political philosophy are structured to incorporate
implicit distributive assumptions. In some cases this is obvious: when
we consider whether a given society is democratic, we must consider
how the franchise is distributed among the members of the society.
Democracy implies political equality and it is simply not compatible
with a situation in which the formal political power of some individuals is much greater than others. Similarly, when we consider whether
a society enjoys the rule of law, we must pay attention to the distribution of access to legal services (at least in a formal sense) and to the
generality of the laws' applicability across the whole array of citizens.
In both cases, an understanding of the concept rules out certain approaches to the distribution of the goods that the concept protects. A
society does not enjoy the rule of law by virtue of most people being
treated as legal subjects with legal rights; it requires that they all be
treated as legal subjects with legal rights. Similarly, a society does
not enjoy democracy by virtue of most citizens having the vote; unless
all adult citizens have the vote, the society is not a democracy. We
60. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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ought to consider the possibility that security is like democracy and
the rule of law in also being structured by some such implicit distributive assumption.
A further intimation along these lines comes by way of analogy
with the liberty side of the liberty-security trade-off. We know that
liberty may be differentially distributed, 61 but we also know that the
very idea of liberty is associated with some firmly established views
about what that distribution ought to be. Though liberty is mainly a
good to the individuals who have it, there are strong principles in the
liberal tradition about ensuring that each person's liberty is made
compatible with an equal liberty assigned to everyone else. The systematic equalization of liberty or its maximization subject to an equality constraint-"the most extensive basic liberty for each compatible
with a similar liberty for all," in Rawls's formula-has been a powerful Kantian theme in the history of liberal thought.62 Most liberals
say that pure maximization of aggregate liberty or average liberty is
out of the question: it would be quite wrong to try to secure greater
liberty for some by restricting the liberty of others. To try that would
be to act, absent some special explanation, 6 3 as though the others
61. And we know also that the real impact on liberty of measures designed to enhance security-like those in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act-may be differentially distributed. As stated in Waldron, Security and Liberty, supra note 3, at 200, "Most of the changes in civil liberties [since
September 11, 2001,] are aimed specifically at suspected perpetrators or accomplices or persons who might be thought to have information about past or future
terrorist actions, and most Americans imagine that persons in these categories
will look quite different from themselves." In fact, leaving aside increased
searches at airports, then as Ronald Dworkin has argued,
None of the administration's [security] decisions and proposals will affect more than a tiny number of American citizens: almost none of us
will be indefinitely detained for minor violations or offenses, or have our
houses searched without our knowledge, or find ourselves brought before
military tribunals on grave charges carrying the death penalty. Most of
us pay almost nothing in personal freedom when such measures are
used against those the President suspects of terrorism.
Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism,N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44,
48.
62. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 250; see IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
231 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797); RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 128 (2000). Also see

BERLIN, supra note 6, at 124-27, for a slightly different formula calling for the
equalization of liberty subject to an individual adequacy constraint.
63. One obvious area that requires more discussion is the special position, with regard to liberty, of those accused or suspected of crime. Plainly, there is some
differentiation between the level of liberty thought appropriate for them and the
level of equal liberty appropriate for members of the community generally. However, these differentiations are treated with great caution and organized in a way
that is as closely commensurate with the principle of equal respect as possible.
We do not think ourselves entitled to differentiate casually, simply because we
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were not worthy of respect or did not count in society so far as the
government was concerned. It is certainly never enough to say, therefore, that the loss of liberty for these few is made up for by the greater
liberty of all other individuals, or that liberty is better off on average,
or that we are better off in some other dimension as a result of restricting some people's liberty. So strong is the association between
the value of liberty and this principle for its appropriate distribution
that the very word "liberty" is sometimes used in a way that suggests
that the distributive principle is incorporated into the concept. 6 4 A
demand for liberty that is incompatible with this principle of equal
liberty is sometimes seen as a demand for license, not liberty. 6 5 So far
as security is concerned, however, this is just an analogy; it does not
tell us much. However, when the good being weighed against security
has this distributive structure, we should not be surprised if security
turns out to have a structure of this kind as well.
C.

Maximization: The Greatest Security of the
Greatest Number?

We could treat the security of a whole society in a straightforwardly aggregative way, simply summing or averaging over individual safety to define a measure of security for society as a whole. That
is, we might say that a whole community is less secure when the average probability of individual death, injury, or loss among the members
of the community goes up. This aggregative approach would take account of variations in the impacts of security measures on different
individuals, and it would enable us to define something analogous to
the economist's social welfare function-a social security functionthink some of us will be better off if others' liberty is restricted. The principle of
equal respect impacts in at least three ways on the appropriate manner in which
suspects of serious crime or danger are treated: (i) it requires us to stay open to
the possibility that they may be innocent; (ii) it constrains the means we use to
determine guilt or innocence; and (iii) it constrains the way we deal with-including the way we punish-those who we are sure are attackers, criminals, or terrorists. Though, in each of these regards, there may well be an issue of lesser
liberty, still the according of lesser liberty to someone suspected of criminal activity, or even to someone convicted of it, is always to be done in a way that is compatible with underlying principles of respect. The traditional civil liberties add
up to a system that is supposed to effect that compatibility. No doubt such systems require adjustment from time to time, to reflect the greater dangers that we
face. But the adjustment must never lose touch with the underlying principle of
respect in regard to suspects and convicts. We are not entitled to readjust the
system of civil liberties simply to make ourselves safer. If we are concerned to
make ourselves safer, any readjustment must be filtered through the medium of
this principle.
64. See RONALD DwORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALiTY 128-31 (2000) (arguing that liberty as a compelling political ideal presents
itself as an ideal of equal liberty).
65. Id. at 126.
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that took all those disparate impacts into account. On the basis of this
sort of conception of security, which we shall call "the maximizing
model of security," we would then be in a position to talk more precisely about trade-offs. Would this be satisfactory? Is this the way to
66
arrive at an adequate conception of security for a whole society?
We saw earlier that Thomas Hobbes adopted something like the
maximizing model of security. The sovereign, he said, should provide
for the security of as many people as possible for as long as possible,
and this may be compatible with some people doing badly for the sake
of the majority. 67 Whether or not this is the right position, it is certainly not supported by the argument that Hobbes provides for it.
Hobbes's argument for this sort of maximization is that "[t]he sovereign as such provides for the citizens' safety only by means of laws,
which are universal."68 In fact, Hobbes provides no argument for the
position that the sovereign is not sometimes empowered to act directly
on the basis of discretionary intervention; that is, he provides no argument against the use of what John Locke would later call "prerogative
power" for security purposes. 6 9 Further, if we confine ourselves to
general laws, the fact is that general laws can be oriented either to the
maximizing of security or to equal protection. Generality as such does
not prejudge that issue.
There are all sorts of reasons for being hesitant about the maximizing model. None of them is conclusive, but they should put us on alert
to the likelihood that this approach is to be rejected as wrong-headed.
66. This raises the question of whether a pure aggregate or average measure of security can be defended as a distributive principle, along the lines of John Harsanyi's response to Rawls's "original position" argument. In other words, the
argument in John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin PrincipleServe as a Basis for
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594 passim
(1975), to the effect that people in Rawls's original position would choose average
utility as their best bet for a society in which they did not know what place they
would occupy. See also RAwis, supra note 33, at 161. The answer is "probably
not." Harsanyi's argument depends on the notion that a distribution of security
with the highest average offers the best bet for a person who does not know which
place he will occupy in the society; the notion of a best bet for such a person
makes most sense when people can think of themselves as repeat players (like a
person choosing strategy for a whole evening of poker) and least sense when people think of themselves as making a one-off bet. But the distribution of security,
with its arguably mortal consequences, is perhaps the least plausible candidate
for such a stochastic approach. Rawls's comment here is apposite: "We must not
be enticed by mathematically attractive assumptions into pretending that the
contingencies of men's social positions and the asymmetries of their situations
somehow even out in the end. Rather, we must choose our conception of justice
fully recognizing that this is not and cannot be the case." Id. at 171.
67. HOBBES, CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 143.
68. Id.
69. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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(i)

The first set of reasons comprises general worries about this
form of consequentialism. Over the last thirty years or so, moral
philosophers have become convinced that there is something
deeply wrong with a position that attempts to maximize important values without any attention to their distribution.70 This
scepticism is particularly focused on utilitarianism, in the sense
of maximizing welfare, but it would not be surprising if it also
applies to a utilitarianism of security.
(ii) Another reason for thinking that the distribution of security
should not be governed by the maximizing model, but rather
should be governed and constrained by egalitarian principles
similar to those with which we control the distribution of liberty,
concerns the relationship between security and human rights.
As we have seen, in Basic Rights, Henry Shue argues that physical security is an indispensable prerequisite for the enjoyment of
any right; it is, in that sense, a basic right. 7 1 Since the general
principle of the distribution of human rights is equality, it is not
unreasonable to infer that the distribution of this very basic prerequisite to the enjoyment of human rights should be distributed
on that basis as well.
(iii) Defenders of a security-liberty trade-off have to be able to respond adequately to the point that since civil liberties are rights
and rights are trumps, civil liberties are not supposed to be
traded off easily against other goods. The best response to this
point is for the defenders of security to say that rights are also at
stake on their side of the balance: there is a right to life and a
right to safety which we are balancing against rights to various
liberties.72 That is not implausible. But if security is going to be
treated as a right, then it has to have the distributive structure
of rights and that structure is egalitarian, not maximizing.
(iv) The maximizing model does not measure up as a description of
our practice. Often we assign resources to the protection of some
individual from an extraordinary threat to an extent that would
make no sense if we were simply trying to maximize the overall
amount of security in the population. The sustained campaign
by British police and security forces to protect Salman Rushdie
70. For the modem consensus against this sort of maximizing consequentialism, see
RAWLS, supra note 33, at 27 ("Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons."). See also NozIcK, supra note 22, at 32-33 ("[Tlhere is no
social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There
are only individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these
people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing
more ....
Talk of an overall social good covers this up."); see generally CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
71. SHUE, supra note 20, at 20-22.
72. See Waldron, Security and Liberty, supra note 3, at 195-99.
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after a fatwa was issued against his life in 1988 is a clear example. The resources assigned to Rushdie's protection involved an
enormous and sustained expense for many years, and there was
no reason to suppose that making him more secure made anyone
else more secure. Quite the contrary-cutting him loose and
leaving him to his fate might well have reduced the danger to
others, especially his police bodyguards. The only explanation is
that the British authorities found it unacceptable that any one
individual's security should suddenly be reduced, by external
threats, to a level so far below the security of most other Britons.
This is not to say that their aim was equality of security, 73 but it
evidently involved qualifying a maximizing approach with the
principle that no one's security should be allowed to drop drastically below a certain minimum level.
D.

Does Sheer Survival Trump Distributive Justice?

It may be thought that the area of security is one in which we
should not pursue issues of distributive justice too fastidiously. Issues
of security involve brutal questions of primal survival. In the last resort, people must be expected to simply do what they can to guarantee
their own safety and that of their families in circumstances of imminent mortal threat. They cannot reasonably be expected to attend fastidiously to fine points of distributive equity under these
circumstances. This point was made (about justice) by David Hume:
Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the
utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing
emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of
property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we imagine,
that men will see any means of preservation before them, and lose their lives,
from a scrupulous regard to what, in other situations, would be the rules of
equity and justice? The use and tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by preserving order in society: but where the society is
ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from
violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for4 himself by all the
7
means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit.

This is not a convincing argument in the present context, however, for
two reasons. First, if it works at all, the Humean argument works
only in the face of the most imminent, focused threat-clear and pre73.

But cf. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41, 49-50

(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
74. DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles Of Morals, in

ENQUIRIES

CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF

MoRALs 167, 186 (L.A. Selby Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1902) (1777).
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sent danger to the individuals concerned. That is not what is being
considered here. This Essay is not about how individuals should respond personally to an immediate threat to themselves or their families, but rather about how the law and politics of a large organized
community like this one should respond to a threat level that is elevated overall, but still quite small for each individual. Under these
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to insist on some degree of distributive sensitivity.
Secondly, even in the circumstances to which it applies, Hume's
argument is not a reason in favor of a maximizing approach. It is a
reason for taking no interest in the social dimension of the matter at
all. It is thus no help for our discussion of security as a social or political ideal. Perhaps from the point of view of a Hobbesian individual,
egoistically obsessed with his own survival, there is no basis for thinking about the proper distribution of security for others. 7 5 I am interested in my survival and you are interested in yours; it is not clear on
Hobbesian grounds why anyone should be interested either in equal
protection or in the security of the majority, except to the extent that
they personally benefit from the implementation of one or other of
these distributive options.76 If it is possible to take a point of view
that transcends that of particular individuals, however, then there is
a distributive question to be faced that is not trumped by the urgent
impulsion of individual survival. Hobbes's sovereign necessarily must
adopt such a perspective in order to figure out his duty "since governments were formed for the sake of peace, and peace is sought for
safety" and "a commonwealth is formed not for its own sake but for the
sake of the citizens." 7 7 It may be true that Hobbes makes a mistake in
thinking that the sovereign's duty is to maximize security, but it is not
a mistake to assume that the sovereign must devote attention to the
principle on which security is to be supplied to the citizens. The inherent urgency of security, the fact that it is a matter of life and death,
does not show that this consideration of a principle for breadth is inappropriate. The sovereign is constrained by the fact that it exists to
promote the safety of all of us, in a given community, not just of me
alone. Maybe as a Hobbesian man, I am preoccupied with what the
sovereign provides for me, but the state cannot be preoccupied with
75. See HOBBES, CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 27 ("[E]ach man is drawn to desire that
which is Good for him and to Avoid what is bad for him, and most of all the
greatest of natural evils, which is death; this happens by a real necessity of nature as powerful as that by which a stone falls downward.... Therefore the first
foundation of natural Right is that each man protect his life and limbs as much as
he can.... By natural law one is oneself thejudge whether the means he is to use
and the action he intends to take are necessary to the preservation of his life and
limbs or not.").
76. The author is grateful to George Kateb for pressing this point.
77. HOBBES, CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 143.
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this to the exclusion of all else. Even if I am entitled to act in certain
circumstances as though the safety of others does not matter as much
as my safety does, the sovereign cannot act as if my safety mattered
more than other people's safety (and I cannot reasonably ask it to). I
know that the sovereign must have in mind its impact on their safety
too.
Another way of putting this is to say that even if security is a desperate issue of life and death from the individual's point of view, the
individual has to recognize that there are limits on what he can expect
the state to do for his security. Maybe the individual will fight tooth
and nail, with little regard for others, to protect his life and that of his
family, but he cannot expect the state to fight for him and his family
with little regardto others. The state must have regard to all of those
whose security it is bound to protect and that necessarily qualifies
what it can do for any one of us. So again, each of us must consider
what the appropriate principle is, equal protection or a maximizing
principle, for the state to supply security across the whole population.
Only then will we be in a position to articulate reasonable and responsible demands of the state on our own behalf.
E.

Security as a Public Good

Perhaps there is another way of avoiding the distributive issue. It
is possible that we might avoid some of these issues about aggregation
and distribution by treating security, insofar as it applies to a whole
society, as a public good. If something is a public good, then by definition any member of the public gets the benefit of it and so the distributive question is put to rest. We need to proceed carefully with this
suggestion, however, because the phrase "public good" is used in a
number of ways in political and economic theory. It is used to refer to
(a) goods provided in a society as a matter of public responsibility; (b)
goods whose enjoyment by and provision to individuals has certain
distinctive features; and (c) goods enjoyed communally or collectively. 7 8 Of these, (a) is a rather loose sense, and it will not be our
concern here, though often it is said that goods are public in sense (a)
on account of their being public in sense (b). Sense (c) we shall consider later in the discussion, in Part V of this Essay. 79 At this stage,
the focus will be on sense (b), goods whose enjoyment by and provision
to individuals has certain distinctive features
78. For an example of sense (a), see Jane Mansbridge, On the Contested Nature of the
Public Good, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3, 3 (Walter W. Powell &
Elisabeth S. Clemens eds., 1998). For an example of sense (b), see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1965). For an example of sense (c), see
Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 844 (1987).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110.
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The term "public good" is used by economists in sense (b) to refer to
goods whose provision and enjoyment has one or both of the following
characteristics:
(b-i) the good is noncompetitive, in the sense that one person's enjoyment of it does not diminish the amount of it available for enjoyment by anyone else; and/or
(b-ii) the good is nonexcludable, meaning that if it is made available to
anyone in a given group (such as a whole society) it is necessarily made available to all members of that group.8 0
Publicness in either sense diminishes the importance of distributive
issues raised in this section. Goods that are nonexcludable are hard to
guarantee to some but not others, and goods that are noncompetitive
do not really pose distributive issues at all; these are goods which we
all enjoy without anyone's enjoyment having to be traded off against
anyone else's.
In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson observed that security and national defense are public goods, at least in sense (b-ii):
The basic and most elementary goods or services provided by government, like
defense and police protection, and the system of law and order generally, are
such that they go to everyone or practically everyone in the nation. It would
obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not
voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government ....81

The idea is that if the government provides a national defense to stop
our enemies from attacking our homeland, then it provides it willynilly to all members of the nation. There is no way any particular
person can be excluded from its benefits (say, for refusing to pay a
specific fee or tax). You cannot sell tickets for national defense. We
might also say that defense is a paradigm case of noncompetitiveness:
the benefit to any American of being protected from invasion by the
Russians is not reduced by any other American's enjoyment of this
good. We can neither exclude nor crowd others out of this benefit. Of
course, the government might choose to provide this good for none of
us or provide it for us all only at an unacceptable level, and that in
itself might be an issue of justice. Once it is provided, however, there
do not seem to be any distributive issues with regard to its provision.
Accordingly, we might be able to avoid the distributive issues about
security which were raised at the beginning of this section under the
heading of "breadth."
Unfortunately, the economist's characterization of security as a
public good is a bit of a cheat. What we all enjoy, nonexcludably and
80. A lighthouse is a public good in senses (b-i) and (b-ii); an encrypted radio signal
(whose content is enjoyable only by those who have paid for a key) is public in
sense (b-i), but not sense (b-ii); and fresh air in a large sealed chamber is public in
sense (b-ii) for those in the chamber, but not in sense (b-i).
81. OLSON, supra note 78, at 14.
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noncrowdably, in regard to national defense is the benefit of being a
member of a nation that is not attacked by its enemies. This makes
the good public more or less by definition. However, it leaves unclear
whether security, in the sense of individuals' safety being actually secured against the threat posed by enemy attack, is provided equally
and in the same way.
There are certainly elements of a public good in the state's antiterrorist policy. If we assume that the terrorists attack large targets
and that there are a small number of them, out of proportion to the
number of their intended victims, then frustrating any one terrorist or
any one terrorist cell may protect many people against large-scale and
repeated attacks. When a cell is taken down, a large number of people
benefit from the elimination of a threat to life and limb and of a source
of fear; and the enjoyment of this good by some who would otherwise
be threatened is not affected by the enjoyment of it by others.
On the other hand, it is evident that security is far from a perfect
example of publicness. First, people may be differently situated with
regard to a given threat. Some regions may be more vulnerable than
others. This is true of classic wartime security: the British government sent children out of the main cities in the Second World War,
reasoning that this was something they could do to keep them safer
from air attack than others whose presence in the cities was required.
The same is true of security against internal threats. Some people
may be forced into situations where they are more likely than others
to be victims of terrorist attack (e.g., poor people in Israel who have no
choice but to use buses).
Secondly, the authorities may attempt to secure members of the
community against some threats but not others, or they may act for
the sake of some people's safety and not others' and so people may
benefit differentially from state action. Even under "normal" circumstances, it is notorious that police treat certain minority neighborhoods as "no-go" areas, entering them only to pursue fugitives or make
arrests, but not to aid or enhance the safety of those who live there. If
police or anti-terrorist resources are scarce, then people and communities may quarrel over them and their allocation will pose issues of distributive justice.S2
82. At the time of writing, there are serious disputes in the United States about the
allocation of Homeland Security funding. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Security Cuts for
New York and Washington, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2006, at A18 ("After vowing to
steer a greater share of antiterrorism money to the highest-risk communities,
Department of Homeland Security officials on Wednesday announced 2006
grants that slashed money for New York and Washington 40 percent, while other
cities including Omaha and Louisville, Ky., got a surge of new dollars. The release of the 2006 urban area grants, which total $711 million, was immediately
condemned by leaders in Washington and New York. 'When you stop a terrorist,
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Third, some of the actions by which the government provides security may in fact compromise the safety of some members of the population. When a government shoots on sight those it suspects of
participation in terrorist attack, then people who match closely the
profile of terrorist suspects may be much less secure against deadly
attack than other members of the society (taking into account the
prospect of deadly attack by the government as well as the prospect of
deadly attack by terrorists).
For these reasons, it is a mistake to assume that, as a matter of
fact, security is always provided equally, even-handedly, noncompetitively and nonexcludably by the government. Later we shall consider
whether security or any aspect of security can be regarded as a public
good in the more diffuse sense of a communal good; sense (c) of those
identified above.8 3 For the time being, however, it is a mistake to
think that the notional designation of security as a public good solves
or preempts any issue about distribution. We have no choice but to
address the various ways in which security might be unevenly provided across a given population.
F.

Diminishing the Security of Some to Enhance the
Security of Others

The previous section noted the possibility that some of the actions
by which the government provides security may in fact compromise
the safety of some members of the population. We shall now devote
some time particularly to that possibility, because it brings issues of
breadth and distribution acutely into focus. We are familiar with the
idea that measures taken to increase security may adversely impact
liberty since that is the starting point of our discussion. However, we
also need to consider the possible adverse impact upon security of
measures intended to enhance security (or measures defended on the
basis that they will enhance security).
Consider the measures that are commonly used against internal or
quasi-internal enemies of the state, supposedly to secure the safety of
citizens. Israel's response to terrorist activity by members of the Palestinian community is a good example. The Israeli measures include
(or have included in the past): targeted assassination of those suspected as terrorist leaders; physical violence against those suspected
of aiding terrorists; abusive interrogation sometimes amounting to
torture of non-terrorists to obtain information about terrorists; detention, concentration, and incarceration without trial of some of those
suspected as terrorists or terrorist accomplices; armed incursions into
they have a map of New York City in their pocket,' Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg
of New York said. 'They don't have a map of any of the other 46 or 45 places.'").
83. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110.
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communities that are suspected of sheltering terrorists; and destruction of houses and property as collective punishments, or as deterrents, or to make certain communal areas more amenable to
84
surveillance and incursion by the state.
In all these cases, state action, motivated by a desire to enhance
public safety, may also threaten the safety of certain members of the
public. Suppose, for example, that a terrorist threat comes from a certain reasonably geographically or ethnically well-defined section of the
community. Then members of that section of the community, including innocent members, may be particularly vulnerable to actions of
the kind listed above. In some cases, innocent people will be vulnerable to collateral damage from actions intended to harm the guilty. In
other cases, they will be vulnerable as the intended targets of actions
motivated by a desire to raise the costs of terrorist activity or lower
the costs of combating it. It is true that the innocent members of the
section of the community in question may also benefit from any reduction in the threat posed by terrorists which results from these measures. However, there is no guarantee that they faced the same threat
as the rest of the public in the first place, nor is there any guarantee
that they will receive the benefit of anti-terrorist measures to the
same extent as other members of the public. Regardless, the enhanced threat to their safety as a result of the state's measures might
well outweigh whatever enhancement of security they receive as a
result.
Anticipating that there will be objections to this way of describing
trade-offs between the security of some and the security of others, we
shall consider and respond to three of them.
(i) We are supposed to be talking about the security of a community
as a political goal for the state which is in charge of that community, but in our discussion in this section we have focused on its
relation to those who are arguably outsiders. Perhaps this makes
the Israeli-Palestinian example a special case. It might have
been better had we focused, for example, on the situation in
Northern Ireland in the 1970s to 1980s, where all the participants were citizens of the United Kingdom. However, just because of its difficulty, the Israeli example does highlight certain
issues that need to be faced about whose security a state should
concern itself with. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip are not Israeli citizens, but until recently all of them were
Israeli subjects, subject to the power and authority of the Israeli
84. This is not to say that these measures are unjustified. Some may be; some may
not; many are prohibited by relevant provisions of Israeli and international humanitarian law. If we were to consider their justification, we would have to take
into account (among other things) the threat to the existence of the State of Israel
and the toll of death and injury from terrorist outrages referred to supra note 38.
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state, and many of them still are. A case can be made that a state
is required to concern itself with the security of all those who are
in the territory it occupies and subject to its authority. Shortly
we will see that there are important connections between security
and state legitimacy, and legitimacy certainly relates to the way
in which a state deals with all its subjects and not just to the way
in which it deals with the subset of subjects it calls its citizens.
International law also supports this conclusion. A state is responsible for the physical security of those it takes as prisoners,
and it is also responsible for the physical security of the inhabitants of lands that it occupies (whether the occupation is lawful or
unlawful).8 5
(ii) A second objection might protest against describing these actions
taken by the state as actions threatening its subject's security.
The conventional trade-off is between security and liberty, and it
may be thought that we should file these costs of the struggle for
security, suffered by those who are shot, beaten, or tortured,
under the heading of liberty. Some of the costs borne by subject
populations surely can be described in that way: restrictions on
freedom of movement, detention, incarceration, and surveillance
can all be understood as denials of freedom. However, not all
such costs can be understood as denials of freedom. Beatings and
torture directly implicate the issue of safety from violence, as do
death and injuries suffered as collateral damage or as a result of
targeted assassination or forced incursions. 86 These are matters
of safety and we have no choice but to factor them into whatever
matrix of safety we are going to use to describe our conception of
security (as a matter of breadth). It is all too easy to think lazily
about this. Consider torture, for example. The fact that torture is
sometimes said to be justified for the sake of security does not
85. For prisoners of war, see Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 ("Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far
enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger."); id. art. 23 ("No
prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be
exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render
certain points or areas immune from military operations. Prisoners of war shall
have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same
extent as the local civilian population."). For occupations, see Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to the Hague Convention art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907 ("The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in
his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.").
86. Sometimes costs of the two kinds are bundled together: people are incarcerated
(which is a loss of liberty) and then beaten or tortured (which is a loss of security).
But we can still distinguish the various costs from one another, even when they
are bundled together in this way.
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mean it has to be regarded as an element of liberty in the great
liberty-security trade-off.87 Recall that we are regarding as an
open question the view that a liberty-security trade-off might be
too simplistic to capture the moral issues involved in the war
against terrorism. Similarly, the fact that civil libertarians oppose torture does not mean that torture is in itself a diminution of
liberty (though usually people's liberty has to be restricted in order to torture them); what it means is that civil libertarians defend a number of rights over and above liberty rights. Liberty is
an expansive category, but it is a mistake to assume that every
harm, or every imposition of death or pain, can be rendered as a
threat to liberty for the purposes of an overly simplistic libertysecurity categorization.S8
(iii) One might think that we should avoid this factoring in of threats
from the state because these prospects of death or violence do not
come at the hands of the right agent. After all, the security we
want is security against terrorists,not against death or injury as
such (irrespective of is source). The state is not a terrorist organization; it is not the sort of entity we seek security against.
There is something to this point, but not much. As mentioned
above, it is true that people do discriminate among different prospects
of death. We are all mortal and we all face illness, disease, and accidents of various sorts; and though we do our best to postpone death
and fight illness and be vigilant against accidents, we do not think it is
the function of the Department of Homeland Security to promote longevity as such, nor do we think that the success of anti-smoking or
traffic safety measures should be factored into our reckoning of such
an agency's effectiveness. s 9 However, the threats to safety involved in
beatings, torture, collective punishment, collateral damage, and so
forth, when they are suffered at the hands of the state, are much more
like threats to safety from terrorism than like road accidents or cancer. They are violent and they are inflicted by a human agency. This
87. It is also important to remember that the most powerful objections (moral and
legal) to torture may have nothing to do with liberty and nothing to do with security: they are direct objections based on its extreme inhumanity. For an account of the most powerful moral objection, see David Sussman, What's Wrong
with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (2005).
88. For a useful discussion along these lines of the analytic relation between liberty
and harm, see H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
534, 547-48 (1973). Also see SHUE, supra note 20, at 187-88, for a criticism of the
tendency to treat security as an aspect of liberty rather than as something important for liberty.
89. Philosophically these discriminations are something of a mystery: Why does
Hobbesian man fear violent death more than death as such? Mercifully they are
not our subject here. It is interesting that in the United States, the Department
of Homeland Security has responsibility not just for protection against terrorist
threats, but also for protection against natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.
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is not to argue for any sort of moral equivalence as between suicide
bombings and military brutality or as between Hamas or Hezbollah
and the Israeli state, or as between Al Qaeda and the present jailers
at Guantdinamo Bay. Moral equivalence is not the issue. The aim at
the moment is to consider only which enhanced prospects of death,
injury, or loss should be factored into our understanding of security,
particularly for the purpose of determining how to approach the distributive question which envisages not a simple trade-off between liberty for all and security for all, but a trade-off of the liberty of a few for
the sake of the enhanced security of some and the diminished security
of others.
G.

States, Security, and Political Legitimacy

At this stage, it is worth pausing to say a little more about why it is
appropriate to consider threats to safety originating from the state
when characterizing security as a basic value that states are required
to promote. It is true that states are not terrorist organizations, but in
a number of respects, this confident assertion needs to be qualified.
Some states, rogue states, for example, may fail and lapse into terrorist or quasi-terrorist organizations. 90 There was concern that this
might be true of Iraq; it was certainly true of Afghanistan prior to
2002.91 In figuring out whether this has happened, we look at what
the allegedly terrorist state is doing so far as the security of outsiders
is concerned. But it is also appropriate to consider, in this connection,
the threat that it poses to its own subjects. No doubt even a terrorist
or quasi-terrorist state seeks the security of some of its members. It
may threaten the security of others, however, and most people believe
that there is a vaguely defined tipping-point in which we should say
that the entity in question no longer qualifies as a legitimate state.
Conversely, we know that many organizations formerly condemned as
terrorist can become legitimate states, by assuming powers of government and using those powers to promote security for all its subjects,
rather than using terrorist powers to promote the insecurity of, for
90. This is different from the point-which is also correct-that some states (including states widely regarded as legitimate) may use terror as a means of waging
war or as a means of political control. See Waldron, Terrorism, supra note 35, at
18-20.
91. See Yochi J. Dreazen & Philip Shishkin, Mideast Peril:Growing Concern: Terrorist Havens In 'FailedStates,' WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2006, at Al; see also Thomas
D. Grant, Partition of Failed States: Impediments and Impulses, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 51, 81--82 (2004) (noting a list of states that fall along a
continuum of failure and observing that failed states are believed to provide sanctuary for terrorists); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence,
Norms, and the "Rule Of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2280 (2003) (arguing that
the restoration of failed states, like Iraq and Afghanistan, has been motivated by
desire to avoid growth of terrorism in those areas).
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example, the members of a colonial regime. 92 It will be impossible to
chart this transition without essaying a sort of security calculus which
can weigh the threat that the erstwhile terrorist organization poses to
the security of some of the people in the territory against the protective functions it performs, or which can weigh the threat that a rogue
state poses to its subjects and balance that against the residual security functions that it still manages to discharge.
To go into this matter in slightly greater detail, think of two
paramilitary organizations, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the
Ulster Defence Force (UDF), in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in the
1980s. These organizations aimed to inflict violence on each others'
members and on members of each others' communities, the loyalist
community and the nationalist community, respectively. They also
sought to protect members of their home communities against these
attacks: the IRA undertook to protect members of the nationalist community against attacks by the UDF and vice versa. Each claimed a
sort of legitimacy for its endeavors, as an alternative to what it regarded as the indifference or oppression of the (British) state in Northern Ireland. The measures taken by each organization, however,
included measures against members of its own community: members
suspected of collaborating with its rival or even just suspected of giving insufficiently enthusiastic support to their own side's campaign. It
also included measures designed to deter collaboration and whip up
enthusiasm and measures designed just to make their operations easier. If we were wondering about the legitimacy of one of these organizations, we would have to ask whether the security of members of its
community was actually enhanced by its activities. In that inquiry we
should have to take into account not just the benefit to members of the
relevant community of measures taken against the other paramilitary
group, but also the effect, both beneficial and detrimental, of measures
taken by the organization against members of the very community it
claimed to be protecting.
We ought to consider the actions performed by a government in
exactly the same way. We should consider the positive effects of some92. See Clive Walker, Cyber-Terrorism:Legal Principleand Law in the United Kingdom, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 657 (2006) ("The idea that 'once a terrorist, always a terrorist' is belied by history, including the life stories of at least one
Prime Minister of Israel (Begin), one President of Cyprus (Makarios) and one
President of South Africa (Mandela) .. ");
see also Ron Walters, The Black Experience with Terrorism,6 How. SCROLL: Soc. JUST. L. REV. 77, 79 (2003) ("The first
time I read the word 'terrorist,' it was in connection with the Mau Mau uprising
in Kenya in the late 1950s. Jomo Kenyatta, associated with this group, which
attempted to make Kenya ungovernable by the British, was referred to as a terrorist and was hunted down by the British colonial authorities and jailed as
such."). For a good general discussion, see CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN'S GULAG IN KENYA (2005).
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thing that calls itself a government on the safety of the individuals in
its territory and balance those effects against the negative effects of
this entity on the safety of the individuals in its territory. Some individuals will be affected one way, some the other way, and some both
ways. Only if we consider all these effects are we in a position to talk
about the government's contribution to security generally for the people in the territory it controls. (We still have not addressed the question of how to assess these individual effects for the purposes of
arriving at an overall verdict on the entity's contribution to the security of the population under its control. At this stage, the point is that
we must assemble all the information that is available about its positive and negative effects on individual safety in order to begin that
assessment.)
Once again, some readers will protest that it is wrong to reach this
conclusion on the basis of an analogy between legitimate governments
and paramilitary terrorist organizations like the IRA. But one of the
things that makes the analogy between governments and paramilitary organizations inappropriate-when it is inappropriate-is that a
legitimate government takes care in regard to security. A legitimate
state takes care in regard to the safety of those in the territory it dominates, whereas an illegitimate regime is either careless of their safety
or solicitous of the safety of some of them but not others. Legitimacy
has to be earned, and one important dimension in which it is earned is
in regard to the pattern of impact of a regime's actions on the persons
subject to its power. Assuming then that the impact of a government's
actions on people's safety may be uneven and in some cases harmful,
we need to ask whether it is possible to articulate any constraints on
the extent of the unevenness for the purposes of a conception of security that pays proper attention to this question of breadth. How uneven can the impact be while the government is still claiming credibly
to promote security, as opposed to acknowledging that it promotes only
the safety of a few favored clients or of a delimited class of people in its
territory?
H.

Breadth and the Logic of Legitimacy

If we pursue this connection between security and legitimacy, we
might be able to make progress in our thinking about issues of
breadth, so far as security is concerned. We might proceed, very modestly, by saying that a regime counts as a legitimate government only
if it has some positive impact on the safety of all of those it claims as
its subjects. I shall call this the "egalitarian model of security." This
is unlikely to be a sufficient condition of legitimacy, but it might be
sufficient for legitimacy so far as safety is concerned. Perhaps the
word "security" is defined in a way that marks this point. No government is legitimate if it does not promote security, and we may say that
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the word "security" captures the pattern of impact on safety that governments are supposed to have so far as that elementary legitimacy is
concerned. The idea is that the government has an elementary obligation to promote security (if it fails in that obligation it undermines its
legitimacy) and what security means in this context is, at the very
least, some positive impact on the safety of all of its subjects.
On this account, a regime is illegitimate if there is some person or
class of persons who would be better off without it, so far as their
safety is concerned, irrespective of what the positive impact on others'
safety might be. We might frame this account in two ways, either by
insisting that a legitimate regime must bring each person's safety up
to at least a certain level, or by insisting that the regime must make a
substantial positive difference to each person's safety even though the
actual level of safety for each may vary according to background circumstances and baseline (i.e., how safe each might be in these circumstances absent any reasonable government).
The egalitarian model of security will seem exasperating to a certain hard-headed pragmatic mentality. From this point of view, the
person-by-person evaluations that the account requires are prissy and
over-demanding. How can we ever be sure that there is not someone
who is left out when "everyone's" security is improved? How can we
possibly leave political legitimacy for a nation of 300 million souls at
the mercy of a criterion as demanding as this? 9 3 As Hobbes reminded
us, governments have to design their security strategies in broad
terms, taking account of the overall impact of what they do. They cannot be expected to undertake the detailed evaluations that this account requires, when they are addressing the safety of a quarter
billion people. For this reason, it may be said that we should abandon
the egalitarian model in favor of the maximizing model of security.
The same may be true of external assessments of legitimacy. Our distinction between legitimate and illegitimate governments, effective
states and failed states or rogue states, in international law is very
broad-brush, and again it might be thought that the maximizing
model captures it more adequately than the egalitarian model.
These pragmatic points are not as convincing as they sound. It is
true that our assessments of legitimacy are rough and ready and may
93. It might also be objected to on the account that it fails to leave room for two
important options that should not be ruled out at the level of definition. The first
is that it may sometimes be necessary to destroy an individual who poses a threat
to the security of others; the second is that it may be necessary, in certain circumstances, to require some to lay down their lives (e.g., in combat) for the sake
of the security of others. But while it is true that we need a theory of security
that does not preclude a priori either conscription or capital punishment, it is
also the case that the logic of conscription and capital punishment presupposes
that we are already in possession of a concept of security defining what these
practices might be set up to defend.
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not be as fine-grained as a literal application of the egalitarian model
might require. But they are also not as fine-grained as the maximizing model, read literally, might require. The question is, when we deploy a rough-and-ready understanding of the security-legitimacy
requirement, what is it a rough-and-ready version of? In at least some
of the cases alluded to in the previous paragraph, it seems that we
work with a rough-and-ready version of the egalitarian model, not the
maximizing model. For example, when we assess the legitimacy of regimes from the outside, we do not rest content with a rough showing
that the safety of more people is advanced than harmed. We look also
at the situation of minorities, and we often hold regimes illegitimate
on account of their failings in regard to the safety of minorities, sometimes quite small minorities, irrespective of the benefits that accrue
thereby to the safety of members of the large majority.
The most powerful argument in favor of the egalitarian model is
based on the elementary logic of political legitimacy. The basic theory
of political legitimacy is individualistic, not collective. Its starting
point is the fact that political regimes make demands upon individuals
one-by-one: I must pay my taxes and you must pay yours; I must obey
each of the laws and so must you. The government does not countenance individual disobedience or failure to pay on the ground that
most others are complying. If the individual challenges the legitimacy
of these demands, some response on behalf of the regime must be
given to him or to her.94 A government's response will normally be
along these lines: "You are better off in certain respects (e.g., safer) as
a result of the existence and activities of the regime. That is why it is
reasonable that we make these demands upon you."
This logic is most vivid in the contractarian approach to political
legitimacy. People enter society in order to provide greater security for
themselves than they could get by their own efforts. "[N]o rational
Creature," wrote John Locke, "can be supposed to change his condition
with an intention to be worse," 95 and no one can be deemed willing to
accept that his own security is properly neglected for that of others.
Perhaps this is not an argument for pure equality of security, but it is
certainly an argument against the position that governments are entitled to neglect the security of some for the sake of the greater security
of others or that they are entitled to negatively impact the security of
a few purely for the sake of the security of the majority.
We have ended a long discussion of breadth. The upshot is that the
issue of breadth presents many difficulties when we consider the application of the term "security" to a whole society or a population. Our
discussion considered whether it is appropriate to take a maximizing
94.

See BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED: REALISM AND MORALISM IN POLITICAL ARGUMENT 3-6 (2005).

95. LOCKE, supra note 69, at 353.
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approach to security (the greatest security of the greatest number) or
whether it is appropriate to organize the pursuit of security as a political goal around some idea of equal protection or the attaining of at
least a minimum security for everyone. Our discussion here has not
been conclusive, though powerful arguments based on political legitimacy and also on the connection between security and rights have
been adduced against the pure maximizing approach. What is clear,
however, is that the distributive issues raised under this heading of
breadth-Whose security is protected or enhanced? Whose security is
neglected or diminished, perhaps for the sake of the security of
others?-cannot be ignored or finessed if security is to be treated as a
political goal.
V.

BREADTH AND DEPTH TOGETHER

So far we have considered security as an array of individual goods.
From a social point of view, it is also necessary for each of us to consider the relation between our own security and that of others, because attention to one person's security may distract from attention to
another's or security may be enhanced for some only at the expense of
others. These are the familiar problems of competition, aggregation,
and distribution that we dealt with in Part IV. So far, however, we
have not explored any positive connections between one person's security and another's. We have not looked at ways in which one person's security may actually depend on that of another, or ways in
which one person's security may be an ingredient in another person's
security. This will be the topic of the second phase of our exploration
of depth in relation to the concept of security. Because it involves a
deepening of individual security by taking into account its positive relation to the security of others, our account at this stage will combine
considerations of what we have been calling till now breadth and
depth.
Earlier, when the various shortcomings in the pure safety conception were set forth, it was mentioned that that conception fails to give
adequate accounts of the relation between security and fear, between
security and assurance, and between security and the idea of social
order. People don't just want to be safe if they are merely surviving,
terrified, in a sealed room. They want some assurance of safety which
allows them to go about their business and deal with one another
while following familiar routines. In Part III, we discussed the modes
of life of individuals and families and about the fears that they may
96
have in relation to their modes of life and their need for assurance.
Now we are going to explore some connections between that and wider
issues of the social distribution of such assurance.
96. See supra section III.A.
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Fear and Identity

Given that each of us thinks of our safety not just momentarily but
projected into the future, we may be concerned about what happens to
others as prefiguring what may happen to us. This is a matter of anxiety and assurance. If something happens to another person which diminishes his safety (perhaps in order enhance my safety at a
particular time), I cannot necessarily detach, from my sense of safety
at that time, the threat that what happened then to the other person
(for my sake) may happen to me at some later time for someone else's
9
sake. 7
A critic might respond that in the real world, one often can have
such an assurance based upon ethnicity. If I am white, if I look,
sound, and behave like a native-born American, there is little chance
that I will suffer the impact of measures designed to combat terrorism.
To the extent that this is so, then I can regard my security as independent of others' security. Even if my security is being upheld by diminishing the security of, for example, Arab-Americans, there is no
reason here for apprehension on my part, since there is little likelihood that the tables will be turned and people like me will be incarcerated or tortured to maintain the security of others.
Notice, however, how this may already represent a cost to me in
terms of political identity. Instead of organizing my sense of security
around my identity as an American, I have to retreat to some narrower (and in other contexts more invidious) sense of identity because
now I am secure on account of my identity as a white American or my
identity as an American who does not look Arabic. Because of terrorism, or because of the state's response to terrorism, I now have to
change the way I think about the connection between identity and security. That may compromise something that an appropriately deep
conception of security would be concerned about.
B.

Security and Markets

If a deeper notion of security is conceived of as offering a platform
on which we might securely enjoy other goods, exercise other rights,
and participate in activities other than the mere avoidance of danger,
then this has important consequences for our relations with others in
97. This reminds us of the famous Martin Niemoller poem: "When the Nazis came for
the communists, I remained silent; I was not a communist. / When they locked up
the social democrats, I remained silent; I was not a social democrat. / When they
came for the trade unionists, I did not speak out; I was not a trade unionist. /
When they came for the Jews, I did not speak out; I was not a Jew. / When they
came for me, there was no one left to speak out." The exact form and original
source of this poem is a matter of controversy. For a useful survey, see Harold
Marcuse, Niemoller, Origin of Famous Quotation, http:/www.history.ucsb.edu/
facultylmarcuse/niem.htm (last visited July 11, 2006).
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society. If I am to participate and flourish in the order of everyday
life, I will want to be able to deal with others, and in many of these
dealings with others it will be important that they are as secure as I
am. No doubt there are some exceptions to this. Some people may
flourish from dealing with others' insecurities. For example, those
who sell bottled water may be able to profit from a lack of security.
However, one suspects that for the most part, people's personal safety
is a platform on which they can deal with others whose safety is
equally assured whether in a market fashion or in some other sociable
fashion. People's willingness to produce the commodities needed to
purchase, produce or consume depends on their being undistracted by
terror and anxiety about their personal safety
It was once said that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself."9 8 Most people acknowledge that widespread fear or widespread
insecurity is something for them to fear even if they do not share the
first-order fear or insecurity themselves. In a modern market economy the situation of any one actor is exquisitely sensitive to the climate of confidence generally. For example, one noticeable effect of the
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States was a short-term
collapse (and the exacerbation of a longer term downturn) in economic
activity. The Dow Jones index lost 7.1% of its value in the first day of
trading after September 11 and continued to fall in the week that followed. 99 Another example is the collapse of the tourist trade in Israel,
a decline of 50% or more, in the wake of recent suicide bombings.100
These economic effects may be attributable to widespread fear that
outrages of the sort that have already occurred are likely to continue-that is, they are symptoms of general insecurity. Beyond that,
and particularly true of the Dow Jones decline, they are also the result
of feedback of people's apprehensions about the pervasiveness of the
fear occasioned by the individual outrages into the system of mutual
98. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), availableat http:ll
www.gutenberg.orgfetext/104 ("So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that
the only thing we have to fear is fear itself-nameless, unreasoning, unjustified
terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.").
99. See Bill Barnhart, Dow Drops 684 Points as Trading Resumes, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
17, 2001, at 1 ("The Dow Jones industrial average closed down more than 684
points, or more than 7 percent, closing below the 9000 mark at 8921, according to
preliminary figures, on extraordinarily heavy New York Stock Exchange volume.
That pushed the Dow to its lowest close since December 1998."); see also Stephen
King, Latest Declines Already the Worst Since 1973 Crash, INDEP. (London), Sept.
24, 2001, at 17 ("The collapse in equity prices over the last few days has been
extraordinary by any standards.").
100. Daniel Ben-Tal, Booking our Brethren, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 15, 2004, at 5
("Tourism to Israel peaked in 2000 when an unprecedented 2,672,000 foreign visitors entered the country. But, the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September that year and the ensuing wave of terrorist attacks, decimated the local
tourist market. Hotel stays by foreign tourists plummeted by 80% between October 2000 and October 2001.").
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confidence generally. Even if frequent occurrences of this kind are not
expected, fear itself still becomes something to be feared, particularly
in a society like ours for which prosperity depends on a cheerful bullish mentality among consumers and investors.1 0 1
C.

Our Way of Life

In Part III, we discussed the importance to individuals and families of their mode of life.102 There is obviously a connection between
individuals and families valuing (on the one hand) their own routines,
their own mode of life, and their own reasonable aspirations for the
trajectory of their lives, and (on the other hand) their valuing a whole
way of life for the society. Usually people's mode of life is both an
instance of and dependent upon the broader way of life that the members of society treasure in general. When we think about our own way
of life, we relate it to the ways of life practiced generally in the society,
and even if our mentality is not conformist, still as social beings we
look for some sort of congruence between what we are doing with our
lives and what others around us are doing with their lives. Many of
the activities we pursue make no sense except as pursued in a wider
social context. We have just seen that this is true for market activity,
but it is also true for countless other activities in work, leisure, romance, and worship. We live together with others and even if we feel
relatively secure, we cannot cut ourselves off from others' insecurities.
At the very least, we rely on the existence of something called "public order," which is a securing of the basic conditions of action and interaction in public places, parks, sidewalks, streets, and highways.
But it is also much more than this. Our social actions make sense
when we play roles in narratives that assign roles to others as coworkers, customers, neighbors, babysitters, teachers, teammates, and
so on. The disruption of such narratives by danger or the fear of danger can leave us unsure of what to do or what our actions amount to.
In a society like the United States, we go cheerfully about most of our
business in public places, such as shopping malls, restaurants,
schools, colleges, churches, sports fields, and cinemas, with minimal
attention to security issues. Imagine the extent, though, to which that
would change if America were to experience bombings in these places
at the rate of one or two a week, each causing the sort of casualties
that recent suicide bombings have caused in Israel, and each publicized as a national tragedy with the full panoply of media coverage. In
responding to this, even ordinary prudence on the part of millions of
individuals would radically alter the way that life is lived in this coun101.
102.

Terrorists are of course strongly focused on these possibilities. See Waldron, Terrorism, supra note 35, at 22-23.
See supra section III.A.
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try. We have had a taste of it with the enhancement of security at
airports, but we have to imagine that similar precautions would be
introduced into all public spaces in which people gather by the scores
or hundreds: malls, soccer fields, schools, movie theatres, etc. People
would be afraid, but the point right now is not the quality of the fear
itself. The point is the likely emergence of a new sort of ethos governing choices about "going out versus staying home," an attenuation
of large-scale social interaction, and a marked degradation in the collective practices and routines of our society. It is possible that we
would all soldier on, putting our children on school buses, going to the
mall, catching movies, eating at McDonald's, etc., with just a few extra
security guards. It is not unimaginable, however, that there would be
a catastrophic disruption in the routines of everyday social life.
Of course, we have to be careful with this. Protecting security is
not the same as protecting a way of life in the same spirit as those who
talk about cultural rights like the preservation of traditions,1O3 but
there are some important analogies. Pervasive and society-wide disruption of the routines and fabric of ordinary life that we find after a
terrorist attack is quite like the longer term cultural disruption that
indigenous peoples are said to experience as a result of colonial incursion and settlement.104
D.

Legal and Constitutional Routines

The routines of ordinary life whose security we value are not just
first order routines like shopping, schooling, and soccer; but also secondary routines that respond to what might be thought of as routine
problems. There are fires, crimes, and accidents; there are threats
from nature and sometimes threats from outsiders; there are disagreements about what ought to be done in response to these. Among our
repertoire of mechanisms for dealing with danger, disorder, and dissensus, we have fire brigades, hospitals and police forces; we have a
legal system, courts, and prisons; we have FEMA and the national
guard; we have our political system, at municipal, state, and federal
levels; and we have our Constitution, our fundamental rights, and our
settled obligations under human rights law.
The existence and the effectiveness of these mechanisms is also
crucial to the assurance that security in normal times involves. Disruption of them may enhance our anxiety and undermine our security,
and sometimes the appropriate response may be to strengthen them
or transform them so that they become more effective against the dangers they are supposed to protect us from even at the cost of other
values they are supposed to embody.
103. See, e.g., WILL KYMcIKA,LIBERALISM,
104. See id. at 147-49.

COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE

135-37 (1989).
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However, these mechanisms are also valued in and of themselves
as parts of our way of life and our social routines. As such, they are
valued for the way they reconcile the demands of security and other
values. We like knowing that searches cannot be conducted without
warrant, that those who are arrested must be read their Miranda
rights, that they are entitled to legal representation and an early
hearing, and that there are limits on what can be done to people, not
just to us, but to anyone, under the auspices of our crime-control system. If these mechanisms are transformed in an emergency to make
them more effective against threats then that transformation may itself be experienced as a disruption of the very way of life we say we
are trying to protect. The detention and indefinite incarceration of citizens, the prison at Guantdnamo Bay, changes or suggested changes
in our legal system to permit inhuman and degrading treatment during interrogation, and the widespread use of extraordinary means of
surveillance and wire-tapping may all be justified, but they are undoubtedly transformative and disruptive of many people's expectations as to how their society and legal system operates.
It is not clear how far we should factor this into the concept of security. It is sometimes thought that terrorists aim to undermine our
legal and constitutional arrangements by attacking us. l0 5 Or it is
said that they want to force the state that they are attacking to drop
the pretence of legality and civil liberties and "show its true colors" as
a repressive entity.106 The fact that terrorists want to force a change
in our legal and constitutional arrangements, however, does not by
itself show that such arrangements are part of our security, especially
since the change they are trying to force is change by the state they
are attacking, rather than change by their own terrorist acts. Clearly
if we do regard our legal and constitutional routines as part of what
we value under the heading of our security, then we undermine any
simple talk of a trade-off between security and constitutional rights.
This issue will be addressed in Part VI. On the other hand, there are
costs in not regarding the integrity of these mechanisms (including
the integrity of legal, constitutional and human rights guarantees) as
part of what people value under the heading of security, or as part of
what they have to lose under the impact of terrorist attack. Since
there is obviously some connection between security and our way of
life, any such exclusion has to draw a rather artificial line, and it
105. See George W. Bush, Freedom at War with Fear, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html ("Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They
hate what we see right here in this chamber-a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms--our freedom of
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree
with each other.").
106. See Waldron, Terrorism, supra note 35, at 32.
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would not be satisfactory to draw that line simply for the sake of underwriting the simplicity of our ordinary talk about a security-liberty
trade-off.
E.

Security as a Collective Good

Very early in this Essay the idea of collective security was mentioned.1 0 7 It was said that in the discourse of international power
politics, security is not understood as something most nations can pursue by and for themselves. It needs to be pursued by groups of nations
acting in ways that establish stable equilibria or it needs to be pursued by the whole community of nations acting in concert. When we
drop down a level from the international arena, we should be open to
the possibility that the notion of security also needs to be understood
as something we provide together. In one sense this is obvious: we
rely on a collective mechanism for much of our actual protection. We
also rely on a set of mutual restraints to maintain each other's security in everyday life. In a richer sense, however, we also act together to
secure the way of life and the patterns of interaction in which our security partly consists. After terrorist attacks, people often act cooperatively and publicly to show that they are determined to maintain
their way of life, even in the face of great anxiety or great anger.10
When this sort of action takes place, it is a clear instance of collective
provision of security; of security being maintained by a whole community showing its determination not to degenerate into a disaggregated
set of terrified individuals. It illustrates a general point about the relation between security and mutual assurance. Security is something
we provide for each other by enjoying together the social order of activity and interaction that defines our way of life and by acting in solidarity with one another to ensure that the benefit of this system is
available to all.
A number of different uses of the term "public good" were mentioned earlier. As well as the technical economist's sense of the term,
i.e., a good enjoyed nonexcludably and/or non-crowdably, the idea of a
good enjoyed communally was mentioned.10 9 Many goods that are
public in the economist's sense are enjoyed individually: even when
they are non-crowdable and nonexcludable, they are still individual
107. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
108. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American
Civic Democracy?, 35 POL. ScI. & POL. 537, 537 (2002) ("Seventy percent of Americans reportedly gave time or money to charities attempting to help the victims of
9/11. . . . Anonymous commuter suburbs in New Jersey suddenly organized to
provide constant care for dozens of families who lost loved ones. In the days and
weeks after 9/11, more than four-fifths of Americans displayed the U.S. flag on
homes, cars and trucks, and clothing.").
109. See supra section IV.E.
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goods. For example, clean air is an individual good in the sense that
its ultimate benefit is to the lungs and respirations of individuals one
by one. Not all goods are enjoyed individually, however. Some goods
are communal in the sense that their enjoyment by any one person
depends on their enjoyment in common with her by others. Conviviality at a party is a clear example; other examples may include certain
aspects of the good of language or culture.11O Many social institutions
and the realization of many social aims and ideals are public goods in
this sense: their enjoyment, nonexcludably and non-crowdably, by
many people at a time is not a contingent factor of the technicalities of
their provision, but an essential part of their social existence.1 11 The
good of a tolerant society, a cultured society, or a society which exercises self-determination are all examples of communal or noncontin12
gent public goods.1
Should we regard security as a public good in this sense? In a recent article on policing, Ian Loader and Neil Walker have made a suggestion to this effect.11 3 They want to emphasize "the irreducibly
social nature of what policing offers to guarantee," and they say we
should think of this not just in terms of individualized safety but also
in terms of a communal good.114 Citing this author's earlier work on
communal goods, they refer to goods which are valuable for human
society without their value being adequately characterizable in terms
of their worth to any or all of the members of the society considered
one by one.1 15 They ask about policing and security: "Is this a public
good in this thicker, communal sense?" Their answer is "unequivocally in the affirmative."1l6 They argue that "public safety is inexorably connected with the quality of our association with others" and that
it "depends upon the texture of social relations and the density of social bonds."'17 The implication of this argument is that while some of
us might be safer under a regime of very aggressive policing our security would be degraded as a public good by distributive degradation in
our scheme of civil liberties. 1 18
There is some plausibility to Loader and Walker's argument. Security is certainly connected with the public enjoyment of public order
and we have seen that it involves aspects of our shared way of life. It
110. See

JEREMY WALDRON,

Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?, in
354-59 (1993).
198-99 (1986).

RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-91, at 339,
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM

LIBERAL

111.
112. See id. at 198-209.
113. Ian Loader & Neil Walker, Policingas a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections Between Policing and the State, 5 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 11 (2001).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 25 (citing WALDRON, supra note 110, at 358-59).
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id.
118. See Waldron, Security and Liberty, supra note 3, at 204-05 n.23.
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would be wrong, however, to exaggerate the communal element or pretend that it exhausted the content of the concept. Much of the work in
this Essay has sought to deepen and broaden what is called the pure
safety conception of security. From the beginning, however, it has
been said that it is important for the concept of security to remain
anchored in the physical safety of individual men and women. That
anchoring is irreducible and non-negotiable. For the last time: Nobody wants to be blown up, and security in the end is about elementary matters of harm and survival. It may have communal aspects
and it may be something that we provide jointly and mutually for one
another in various ways, but most of the complications developed here
have attempted to show that security is a complex and structured
function of individual safety, not an amiable communal alternative to
it.
VI.

COMPLICATING THE TRADE-OFF

The analysis of security undertaken in this Essay is done partly as
an end in itself, to fill the disgraceful gap in political philosophy in the
analytic treatment of the main goals, principles, and values of politics.
Security is an enormously important goal. It is fundamental to our
thinking about legitimacy. It is deceptively simple on the surface, but
as we have seen, it is quite complex underneath. It is a matter of
shame for political philosophy that it has not been subject to greater
analytic attention. Conceptual analysis, at its best, is a collective enterprise; others see sometimes what we do not see or defects in our
account that we have become insensitive to. This Essay is just a beginning and it is far from perfect. It is hoped that it will elicit some
responses from others who are interested in this analytic project.
The task of establishing a clear understanding of security, sensitive to its conundrums and complexities, is particularly important in
these troubled times, when security is constantly invoked as a reason
for diminishing the extent of other values, such as liberty, or the application of other principles, such as other individual rights. If we face a
trade-off between liberty and security, then it is as important to know
what security is as it is to know what liberty is, so we can see what is
at stake on both sides of the balance.
Elsewhere, this author has expressed doubts about the more simple-minded versions of the liberty-security trade-off. 1 19 However, this
study of security was not undertaken specifically to undermine this
talk of a trade-off. Throughout this Essay, it has been said that we
should be alert to the possibility that the relation between liberty and
security is more complicated than it at first appears.
119. See id. passim.
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One set of complications is that we are not talking about trade-offs
among abstract homogenous values, but about values that may be distributed unevenly across a population. We already know that this is
true for liberty because even if liberty starts out being roughly equal
in the community, the changes that are envisaged as a result of the
trade-off are not evenly spread through everyone's liberties, but involve a diminution in the liberties of some against a general background in which most citizens' liberties are unaffected.120 In this
Essay, we have seen that this is also true for security. Some of the
changes that are advocated and undertaken for the sake of security
actually have an uneven impact on security. They protect the security
of some while neglecting or actively undermining the security of
others.12 1 To point this out, with regard to liberty and security, is not
to deny that changes might need to be made, and that these changes
might be justified for security's sake. We must not think childishly
about the changes, however. It is not a case of everyone giving up a
few liberties so that everyone can be more secure. Some are making a
slight sacrifice of liberty, others are making a very considerable sacrifice of liberty, and a few are actually losing their security, so that most
can be more secure. If we plan on justifying this, we should not do so
insouciantly using the discourse of a simple trade-off between liberty
and security. Instead we should think in terms of (1) a distributive
matrix of liberty or civil liberties, involving values spread unevenly
across different people or categories of people (e.g., majorities and minorities) facing (2) a distributive matrix of security, again with values
spread unevenly across different people or categories of people. We
should also think about the prospect of various changes in the values
arrayed in the two matrices. If we can begin thinking like thatthinking in terms of whose liberty, whose security is being enhanced
1 22
or diminished-then we will have made some progress.
As well as distributive issues, we need to think about the impact of
our substantive analysis on the idea of a trade-off between liberty and
security. The idea of a trade-off between liberty and security makes
120. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Waldron, Security and Liberty,
supra note 3, at 200-04.
121. See supra Part IV; see also supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
122. In conversations on these matters, I have found that those who think in economic
and rational-choice terms about trade-offs between two commodities-using indifference curves and so on-are enormously resistant to this point. Because they
know how to diagram simple intrapersonal trade-offs (between, say, milk and
oranges), they will tend to regard any situations that do not conform to that image as deviant or marginal. But the features that distinguish the trade-offs we
face from the simple trade-offs diagrammed using indifference curves-features
like considering the loss of liberty for some for the sake of an increase in security
for others-are morally crucial and absolutely salient to the politics of the war on
terror. The familiarity of economists and rational-choice theorists with a certain
sort of diagram is not an adequate reason for ignoring this.
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clearest sense if we think of liberty and security as separate values,
logically independent of one another, and related in a sort of inverse
way: the more liberty there is, the less security you are likely to have,
and the more security you desire, the more liberty you are going to
have to give up. If we find, however, that liberty and security are not
logically independent but that there are important internal relations
between them, or if conceptual analysis indicates that they stand
sometimes in a direct rather than in an inverse relation to one another, then talk of a trade-off will be complicated, if not undermined.
Some ways of making this point are more sophisticated than
others. In a recent article, Thomas Powers observes that "the point of
security is liberty,"123 and he quotes Montesquieu as saying that
"[plolitical liberty consists in security or, at least, the opinion one has
of one's security." 12 4 He then makes the following observation:
Every threat, from whatever source, is as much a threat to our liberty... as to
our security.... American democracy would be done a service if we would use
exclusively either the language of security or the language of liberty. A debate, for example, over how to weigh the threat military tribunals pose to the
liberties of war-crimes suspects against the threat terrorists pose to the liberties of citizens would be more clear-sighted than is our current division of
these issues along liberty versus security lines. Similarly, sorting out the impact of new police powers under the USA PATRIOT Act in terms of security
against terrorism on the one hand, and security against errors of state prosecution or police abuses on the other, would more accurately capture what is at
stake. What we need is to reframe our discussion around the decidedly unglamorous task of balancing one threat to liberty against other threats to liberty, one threat to security against other threats to security. I do not wish to
suggest that recasting the question in these terms will easily settle the many
difficult choices that must be made in the war on terror, but it would permit
us to face them more clearly
and without fearing that we are being either
125
unprincipled or soft-headed.

The points that Powers makes are interesting and they recall earlier
themes in our discussion. On the one hand, his proposal reminds us of
a suggestion which we considered earlier: we might detach the term
"security" from its specific connection with safety and use it to refer to
the assured possession and enjoyment of any value, including

liberty. 126
On the other hand, his proposal reminds us of a suggestion which
we rejected: that threats to life and limb, or the infliction of harm and
pain, can be reclassified as threats to liberty. 127 We considered and
rejected that with regard to the costs that are imposed on certain people when the state seeks to enhance security by killing or torturing
123. Thomas Powers, Can we be Secure and Free?, PuB. INT., Spring 2003, at 3, 5.
124. Id. at 22 (quoting MONTESQUIEu,THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 188 (Anne Cohler et al.
eds., 1989) (1748)).
125. Id. at 22-23.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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some of those subject to its authority. We should also reject it with
regard to the damage that terrorists are seeking to inflict upon us.
Perhaps one could say that they intend to attack our liberties because
"[tihey hate our freedoms."128 But that is a misleading way of talking
if it is supposed to describe the direct and murderous intention they
have against our lives and other aspects of our safety. The language
of security is not reducible to safety, but it is firmly anchored to safety
and we should not flinch from saying that this is what the terrorists
are trying to attack and this is what we are trying to protect. Here, for
all its complexity, the language of security is more apposite than the
language of liberty. By the same token, the language of liberty is
sometimes more useful than the language of security to describe many
of the costs that are being imposed in the war against terrorism.
Some of those costs are security costs (as when some individual is shot
or tortured by agents of the state), but many of them are liberty costs.
Those who are incarcerated at Guantinamo Bay have suffered a drastic loss of liberty, and the same is true of some United States citizens,
like Yaser Esam Hamdi.1 29 Their liberty has been radically diminished to make us more secure against murderous attack. No amount
of word play, provocative though it may be in Powers's article, can
take away the fact that someone's liberty is being traded off against
someone's security in these instances.
At the beginning and toward the end of this Essay, we considered
whether security should be taken to comprise people's individual, familial, and social way of life.130 President Bush has said that our way
of life is certainly a target for terrorism: "These terrorists kill not
merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life."131 While
that in itself does not mean that the maintenance of our way of life is
comprised in our security, it is pretty clear that security would be impoverished without taking this aspect into account. In the course of
that discussion we considered whether in this regard security might
be thought to comprise some reference to aspects of our civil liberties.
Certainly our way of life consists in part in our constitutional traditions and the pathways of our legal system. But again, we need to be
very careful with this. Instead of saying that we have identified an
overlap between security and liberty, we might say that the partisans
of security just like the partisans of liberty identify important aspects
of our way of life that they want to emphasize, but they emphasize
them in different ways and in light of somewhat different concerns.
128. George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), in WASH.
POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A24.
129. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004).
130. See supra section III.A (individual and familial); supra text accompanying notes
111-12 (social).
131. Bush, supra note 128, at A24.
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Our way of life is a common reservoir of values, common to both
sides in this debate. The civil libertarians emphasize the liberties
that matter to us, and certainly it is right to point out that those liberties require security for their meaningful exercise. The partisans of
security point out that they are trying to protect our way of life (as
well as our lives themselves) against attack, and certainly it is right to
point out that you cannot do that if you treat our liberties as unimportant. But still there is a genuine trade-off. Even if it is not a trade-off
between one set of values and another quite distinct set of values, it is
a trade-off between the importance of protecting certain values in one
way and the importance of vindicating certain values in another way.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have tried to complicate and enrich our sense of
what security involves, and that involved exploring some internal connections between security and liberty and between security and constitutional values. But I have tried to respect the idea of security as
an important array of concerns that cannot be wished away or turned
into something else. I have tried to preserve the core connection between security and safety, while noting the various ways in which that
connection is not the whole story about security. And I have tried to
do what the pure safety conception by itself cannot do: provide an account of security not just as an individual value but as an articulate
social concern.
Analytic philosophers are fond of quoting Bishop Butler's aphorism: "Everything is what it is and not another thing."132 And that
may be said of security: security is what it distinctively is. It is not a
site where we try to cram together a lot of other disparate values. But
that does not relieve us from the task of analysis and from exploring
connections with other values if there are any, connections which are
important to the notion of security, connections whose suppression
would misrepresent and impoverish the concept. The philosopher
W.K. Frankena added a mischievous gloss to Butler's aphorism. He
wrote: "Everything is what it is and not another thing; unless of
course, it is another thing, in which case that is what it is."133 That is
how I believe we should think about security. We should keep faith
132.

JOSEPH BUTLER, FIFTEEN SERMONS PREACHED AT THE ROLLS CHAPEL, at xxix

(4th

ed., London, 1749). G.E. Moore used this aphorism as the motto for PRINCIPIA
ETHICA (1903), to express his position that even if goodness is consistently associated with some property like pleasantness, still that is a correlation rather than
an identification: goodness and pleasantness remain distinct properties. Isaiah
Berlin used a version of it in his discussion of liberty. See BERLIN, supra note 6,
at 125 ("Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or
justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience.").
133. W.K. Frankena, The NaturalisticFallacy, 48 MIND 464, 472 (1939).
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with its distinctiveness as a political ideal, but not take that as a license for simple-mindedness about what it involves. Certainly, we
should never take its distinctiveness as a reason for avoiding or denying aspects of security itself just because they are troubling to our
strategies in the war on terror or just because they reproach or expose
as inadequate some of what we propose to do to protect our people and
their country.

